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Key definition 
Place-value economic development 
Place-value economic development is a form of place-based development.  
Place-value economic development places a particular community and the self-identified potential 
of that community and place (area) at the centre.  
Place-value economic development results in cooperation-focused regional economic development 
strategies built around the unique value and potential of a place.  
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Executive summary 
Place-value and ‘partnership, collaboration and cooperation’-focused 
development in remote areas 
Place-based rural and regional development is an important and key strategy for building and 
sustaining regional communities in Australia. 
The key foundational principle of contemporary regional development in Australia is ‘partnerships, 
collaboration and cooperation’ between the government, the private sector and communities. The 
involvement of a range of stakeholders in regional development processes means there is greater 
potential for community ‘ownership’ of infrastructure, growth and innovation projects, and of the 
pooling of resources to reach mutually beneficial outcomes.  
Place-value economic development is a form of place-based development that places a particular 
community and the self-identified potential of that community and place (area) at the centre. Place-
value economic development results in cooperation-focused regional economic development 
strategies built around the unique value and potential of a place.  
This Research Paper uses the concept of ‘place-value economic development’ to illustrate the 
potential of a community-led, and government-supported, remote area economic development 
strategy that is conceptualised around the historical and inherent agricultural value of the sheep 
and wool industry in Central West Queensland. This place-value-focused strategy – ‘Bring back the 
sheep’ – relies on the participation of a range of stakeholders. In return, an even broader range of 
stakeholders stand to benefit.  
The case studies 
This Research Paper undertakes two case studies to explore different conceptions of partnerships, 
collaboration and cooperation in reference to the application of two policy tools – loans and grant 
funding – in very remote area development.  
The setting of the case studies is the RAPAD region of Central West Queensland. The case 
studies are focused on the construction of exclusion fences as the essential element of the ‘Bring 
back the sheep’ economic development strategy. Wild dogs are pest animals and exclusion fences 
are an important tool in wild dog management. Exclusion fences are infrastructure that benefits 
landholders, communities and the government in the context of pest management. 
The case studies are: 
1. The loan-based Longreach Wild Dog Exclusion Fence Scheme (LES) and 
2. The RAPAD Cluster Fencing Grant Scheme (RAPADCS). 
The two exclusion fencing schemes employ different policy tools – a long term loan and grant 
funding respectively – to facilitate the construction of exclusion fences on privately owned land. 
Overall, the net cost to the government of using the policy tools are low, but both have the potential 
to deliver high returns in very remote communities. 
The LES involves a long term, low interest rate loan from the Queensland Treasury Corporation to 
the Longreach Regional Council (LRC). The LRC uses the loan to build exclusion fences on private 
property and landholders repay the LRC over a twenty year period through special rates. In the 
RAPADCS, groups of landholders apply for grant funding that subsidises their cost of material to 
construct an exclusion fence over a cluster of participating properties. In many cases, landholders 
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build the fences themselves. Their in-kind contribution counts toward their own co-contribution, 
which is a requirement to participate in the scheme. 
The LES and RAPADCS are characterised by a high level of cooperation between the state, local 
government, a regional body and landholders that extends to several areas: 
 Funding 
 Governance, accountability and reporting 
 Pest management, and 
 Facilitative infrastructure investments focused on region-wide economic growth. 
The relevance of the case studies to other infrastructure investment projects 
In order to find the most appropriate legal framework, financing alternative and business model for 
infrastructure investment projects that involve multiple stakeholders, it is important to understand: 
 The nature of the infrastructure asset 
 What the asset does, and 
 Who benefits from the asset, both directly and indirectly. 
Whether in reference to exclusion fencing or other infrastructure investment projects, an analysis of 
these factors provides a clear delineation between decision rights, ownership rights, ownership 
obligations and control rights in multi-stakeholder infrastructure investment projects, that: 
 Are an indicator of the complexity of the arrangement between the parties 
 Drives the choice of legal structure most suited to the investment 
 Identifies the risks associated with the project from different perspectives 
 Matches investments to returns. 
The case studies consider the nature of exclusion fences as infrastructure assets, the funding 
models applied, and the level of practical, social and financial cooperation required to achieve the 
desired outcomes. Furthermore, the case studies provide insights into the role and efficacy of 
loans and co-funding grants in infrastructure investments in remote and very remote areas.  
The systematic approach used to analyse the application of long term loans and grant funding as 
policy tools in the context of ‘partnerships, collaboration and cooperation’, serves as a blueprint for 
the assessment of government involvement in other privately-owned infrastructure investment 
projects that have the potential to drive economic growth in communities. 
Key risk areas explored 
The case studies identify and explore key risk areas of government-funded or government-facilitate 
infrastructure investments.  
Firstly, the Research Paper analyses the private benefits that arise from subsidised private 
infrastructure investments that are the inevitable result of grant funding, and the private 
benefits that arise from very long alternative payment terms to enable infrastructure 
investments. The paper contrasts these private benefits with the net public benefits that arise from 
exclusion fences and assesses alternative strategies to deal with the private benefits that arise 
from the two schemes in the case studies. 
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Secondly, the Research Paper pinpoints the financial risks present in the two schemes and 
explains how existing regulatory processes are able to limit the credit risk borne by local 
government authorities when they act as funding agent between the state and private enterprise.  
Thirdly, time plays an important role in the two case studies, and has different cost and time value 
of money implications for the different parties to the funding arrangement. The systematic 
analysis of ‘time’ in each case study reveals the advantages and disadvantages of loans 
and grant funding as policy tools. 
The fourth key risk associated with fencing is freeriding. The case studies explore different forms 
of freeriding namely: freeriding in the construction of a fence; monitoring and maintenance 
freeriding; and differential payment-based freeriding. The paper points out that there are extensive 
regulatory processes to deal with freeriding associated with dividing fences and contrasts 
this position to the higher risk of freeriding that is present in other infrastructure investment projects 
such as those associated with telecommunication and energy. 
The fifth important aspect of the Research Paper is the process required to identify the most 
appropriate legal framework and business model for infrastructure investment projects that 
involve multiple stakeholders. The paper illustrates how important it is to understand the nature 
of the asset, what it does, and who benefits from the asset, both directly and indirectly.  
Key comparisons between the LES and RAPADCS 
 The LES and RAPADCS both aim to facilitate place-value economic development in a very 
remote area of Queensland 
 The time that it takes to construct an exclusion fence on one property (LES) is similar to the 
time it takes to construct an exclusion fence over more than one property, referred to as a 
cluster fence (RAPADCS) 
 The term to repay the LES loan from the perspective of the LRC and participating graziers is 
20 years. That is different to the cash flow timing in the RAPADCS, as the grant funds transfer 
to cluster participants conclude when the construction of the cluster fence is completed. In the 
event that participants in the RAPADCS require debt to fund their contribution to construct the 
fence, their own funding arrangement is a private matter 
 Participants in the LES are liable for the full cost of the fence plus interest, repaid over a 20 
year period. They benefit from the time value of money that reduces their overall cost 
 Participants in the RAPADCS benefit from a lower cash outlay due to the grant funding that 
subsidises cost of the material required to construct the fence and because they participate in 
the construction of the fence and their in-kind contributions are recognised in the overall 
project proposal and budget 
 The LES is not premised on cooperation between landholders. The requirement that 
RAPADCS participants must use one legal entity to access grant funding, facilitates and 
enforces cooperation between them 
 The grant-funded RAPADCS results in the distribution of cash from the government to private 
landholders. There is no net cash outflow for the government in the LES 
 There is no credit risk associated with the RAPADCS, except to the extent that individual 
landholders have to use debt funding to pay for some of the fence construction, but the risk is 
borne by financial institutions and not parties to the cluster arrangement 
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 The credit risk in the LES is borne by the LRC, but the risk is low as the LRC is a preferred 
creditor through the regulatory device that facilitates the special rates repayment scheme 
 Partnerships, collaboration and cooperation are an essential part of both schemes and involve 
the government and landholders 
 As long as participants pay their special rates in the LES, no private benefits arise in the hands 
of landholders, except that they benefit from the time value of money as they pay special rates 
over 20 years, and to the extent that the interest on the QTC loan to the LRC is low 
 The grant funding in the RAPADCS reduces the landholder cost of constructing the cluster 
fence. In that way, private benefits accrue directly to landholders 
 Grant funding may lead to increased spending on cluster fences and other infrastructure, due 
to the direct financial support that primary producers receive through grants. 
Is there a clear winner? 
The LES and RAPADCS illustrate how community-led and government-supported place-value 
economic development strategies and policy tools are able to operate effectively, using different 
conceptions of partnerships, collaboration and cooperation. Both schemes achieve the intended 
outcome, which is to construct exclusion fences on a large scale and over a relatively short 
timeframe to address the problem of wild dogs which in turn, has the potential to ‘Bring back the 
sheep’ to Central West Queensland. The ‘place value’ of this remote region is linked to the 
agricultural history and place-potential of sheep and wool industries. 
The novel approaches taken in the LES are: 
 The role of the LRC in using economies of scale to purchase fence construction material 
 The manner in which the LRC’s credit risk is addressed through the regulatory device of 
special rates 
 The long special rates repayment period of 20 years that results in a relatively low annual 
payback burden for graziers who may already have high debt, are destocked, and need time 
to build their flocks. In particular, grazier have no special rates payments for the first two years, 
and interest-only special rates for three years thereafter 
 From a government perspective, the scheme entails a loan that is repaid in full, albeit over a 
long period and at a low interest rate. 
The novel approaches taken in the RAPADCS are: 
 The extent to which graziers quantify and place a value on their in-kind contributions to 
construct the fences themselves, to meet the co-contribution requirement to apply for grant 
funding which is aimed at meeting the majority of the costs of material 
 The choice of the new separate legal entity that clusters use as the vehicle to facilitate the flow 
of grant funding. The choice of an incorporated association fits the very limited shared control 
and ownership rights present in cluster fences 
 The requirement that clusters of graziers apply jointly for grant funding through a collaborating 
agency. Using this approach, the private benefits of grant funding that accrue to one grazier is 
moderated, and an additional governance layer is introduced to this form of state support. 
The risks and burden associated with freeriding and fence maintenance are present in both 
schemes. However, the extensive regulatory processes to deal with disputes over dividing fences, 
and graziers’ practical experience with fence repair and maintenance act as counter balance.   
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1 Introduction 
Regional Australia is key to the national economy through agriculture, forestry and fishing, mining, 
tourism, and gas and electricity generation. Regional Australia produces approximately 40 per cent 
of the national economic output. Its prosperity is fundamental to the retention of strong 
communities and to the functioning of cities.1  
There is no denying that regional Australia is sparsely populated compared to major cities. 
Melbourne and Sydney are home to about 40 per cent of Australia’s population. Similarly, other 
capital cities continue to grow.2 In Queensland, close on 83 per cent of the State’s population live 
in major cities and inner regional areas.3  
Regional development policy is characterised by the tension present in a multilayered governance 
hierarchy in which the three tiers of government play a complementary and competing role. 
Inevitably, regions compete for resources against densely populated cities. But allocating 
resources to regional Australia using a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach is similarly ineffective due to the 
diversity of the regions themselves. Striking the right balance between distance and population 
size in regional development remains elusive.4 
It is within this dynamic contemporary regional development context that this Research Paper 
considers the role of partnerships, collaboration and cooperation in infrastructure investment 
projects in very remote Central West Queensland. In particular, the paper uses the construction of 
exclusion fences for a case study approach to compare the role of two policy tools – loans and 
grant funding – in a community-focused economic development strategy that was formulated 
around the historic and inherent agricultural value of Central West Queensland: the sheep and 
wool industry.5  
 
2 Place-based vs people-focused regional 
development 
As is the case nationally, regional Queensland makes a significant contribution to the economic, 
social and environmental development of the State.6 The relative contribution of each part of 
regional Queensland is dependent upon a range of factors that include the availability of 
infrastructure, climatic conditions, industry focus and dependency, distance from major centres and 
the distribution and availability of human capital. These factors also play a role in the equitable 
allocation of Commonwealth and State resources and in policy development. 
  
                                                     
1 House of Representatives Select Committee on Regional Development and Decentralisation, Parliament of Australia, Regions at the 
Ready: Investing in Australia’s Future (Report, June 2018) xxv; Commonwealth, Regions 2030: Unlocking Opportunity (Report, 
2017) 2; Commonwealth, A Message from the Minister (Regional Growth Fund Guidelines, 2018). 
2 House of Representatives Select Committee on Regional Development and Decentralisation, Parliament of Australia, Regions at the 
Ready: Investing in Australia’s Future (Report, June 2018) iii. 
3 See Table 1. 
4 Commonwealth, Regions 2030: Unlocking Opportunity (Report, 2017) 2, 4; House of Representatives Select Committee on Regional 
Development and Decentralisation, Parliament of Australia, Regions at the Ready: Investing in Australia’s Future (Report, June 
2018) 17–18; 127–30; 137–8. 
5 See, eg, Commonwealth, Regions 2030: Unlocking Opportunity (Report, 2017) 3; House of Representatives Select Committee on 
Regional Development and Decentralisation, Parliament of Australia, Regions at the Ready: Investing in Australia’s Future (Report, 
June 2018) 19, 70–2. 
6 Hurriyet Babacan and Allan Dale, ‘Emerging Rural/Regional Policy considerations for Queensland’ (Policy Development Paper, Rural 
Economies Centre of Excellence, February 2019) 2. 
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Spatial, or geographical economic and infrastructure developments (place-based) are often 
designed in reference to distance, to provide and maintain access to universal services such as 
roads, education, training, telecommunication systems and recreational facilities.7 Human capital-
driven (people-focused) economic and infrastructure developments must, of necessity, consider 
population density quantitatively against some benchmark or comparison.  
Place-based development is often regarded as a preferred option for regional development.8 
Place-based rural and regional development is a key strategy for building and sustaining regional 
communities in Australia.9 Place-based and people-focused development have a symbiotic 
relationship. People-focused investments in capacity building through education, training and 
leadership development and investing in human capital through service delivery, help to ensure 
that communities remain in regional areas, but likely only when they are enabled to do so by the 
necessary infrastructure.10 
There are also competing forces at play between place-based and people-focused resource 
allocation. While infrastructure investments are required to provide basic universal services for 
everyone, the cost of doing so in remote regions may not be equitable when viewed from the 
perspective of large populations that are concentrated in cities.11 The argument that place-based 
regional development is more important than people-focused development because it has the 
potential to addresses congestion in cities (people-focused problems), is predicated on the belief 
that better infrastructure and access to services might encourage people and businesses to 
relocate to regions. Convincing businesses and individuals to relocate to remote and very remote 
regions is a different matter altogether.12 
Research has shown that remote and very remote regions have unique challenges with economic 
and social viability, declining populations, and a lack of infrastructure and access to services. 
There is a high cost of doing business in remote regions and some evidence of a high cost of 
living.13 Albeit that the efficacy of these measures is questionable in the long run, tax law is often 
used as a policy tool to compensate businesses and individuals when they choose to be located in 
remote areas of Australia. For example, businesses are able to benefit from the creation of special 
economic zones and discounts or exemptions from payroll tax; individuals benefit from the zone 
tax offset and fringe benefits tax remote area concessions that are all currently under review.14 
These targeted measures rely on measurable concepts of remoteness. In identifying emerging 
regional policy considerations for Queensland through the Rural Economies Centre of Excellence, 
                                                     
7 House of Representatives Select Committee on Regional Development and Decentralisation, Parliament of Australia, Regions at the 
Ready: Investing in Australia’s Future (Report, June 2018) 127–8. 
8 See, eg, Productivity Commission, Remote Area Tax Concessions and Payments (Draft Report, August 2019) 18, 108, 172–3; 
Fabrizio Barca, Philip McCann and Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, ‘The Case for Regional Development Intervention: Place-Based versus 
Place-Neutral Approaches’ (2012) 52(1) Journal of Regional Science 134, 139–40; Fabrizio Barca, An Agenda for a Reformed 
Cohesion Policy: A Place-Based Approach to Meeting European Union Challenges and Expectations (Independent Report, April 
2009); World Bank, Reshaping Economic Geography (Report, 2009). 
9 See, eg, House of Representatives Select Committee on Regional Development and Decentralisation, Parliament of Australia, 
Regions at the Ready: Investing in Australia’s Future (Report, June 2018) 127; Commonwealth, Building Stronger Regional 
Communities 2019-20 (Statement, 2 April 2019) 7, 51, 53, 146, 121. 
10 House of Representatives Select Committee on Regional Development and Decentralisation, Parliament of Australia, Regions at the 
Ready: Investing in Australia’s Future (Report, June 2018) 79–82. 
11 House of Representatives Select Committee on Regional Development and Decentralisation, Parliament of Australia, Regions at the 
Ready: Investing in Australia’s Future (Report, June 2018) 79–82. 
12 House of Representatives Select Committee on Regional Development and Decentralisation, Parliament of Australia, Regions at the 
Ready: Investing in Australia’s Future (Report, June 2018) 43. 
13 See, eg, Productivity Commission, Remote Area Tax Concessions and Payments (Draft Report, August 2019) 83, 100; 
Commonwealth, Australian Infrastructure Plan: Priorities and Reforms For Our Nation’s Future (Report, February 2016, 
Infrastructure Australia) 138; Hurriyet Babacan and Allan Dale, ‘Emerging Rural/Regional Policy considerations for Queensland’ 
(Policy Development Paper, Rural Economies Centre of Excellence, February 2019) 8; Sally Shortall and Margaret Alston, ‘To Rural 
Proof or Not to Rural Proof: A Comparative Analysis’ (2016) 44(1) Politics & Policy 35, 40, 45. 
14 Productivity Commission, Remote Area Tax Concessions and Payments (Draft Report, August 2019) 18. 
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Babacan and Dale highlight the inconsistencies in, and the lack of one uniform definition, to 
distinguish between ‘rural’, ‘regional’ and ‘remote’.15  
In this Research Paper, relative remoteness is important in order to understand the challenges that 
remote and very remote Queenslanders face.  
 
3 Regional, rural and remote Queensland 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) uses five classifications of remoteness derived from the 
Accessibility and Remoteness Index of Australia (ARIA+): major cities, inner regional, outer 
regional, remote and very remote.16  
This Research Paper adopts this classification to demonstrate aspects of remoteness in reference 
to Central West Queensland. The ‘remoteness distribution’ of areas across Australia (Figure 1),17 
and Queensland (Figure 2),18 demonstrate large areas are considered very remote. 
 
   
Figure 1 – Remoteness Areas Australia  Figure 2 – Remoteness Areas Queensland 
 
Table 1 focuses on Queensland’s population distribution based on ‘remoteness’. This table 
includes data on the top five responses in percentage terms, of the industries that individuals are 
employed in. In remote and very remote areas of Queensland, employment in the beef cattle 
industry and in the public sector and local government dominate.  
                                                     
15 See, eg Hurriyet Babacan and Allan Dale, ‘Emerging Rural/Regional Policy considerations for Queensland’ (Policy Development 
Paper, Rural Economies Centre of Excellence, February 2019) 4, 8–10; Sally Shortall and Margaret Alston, ‘To Rural Proof or Not to 
Rural Proof: A Comparative Analysis’ (2016) 44(1) Politics & Policy 35, 40. 
16 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Statistical Geography Standard (ASGS): Volume 5 – Remoteness Structure (Catalogue No 
1270.0.55.005, July 2016). 
17 Australian Bureau of Statistics, The Australian Statistical Geography Standard (ASGS) Remoteness Structure (15 March 2018).  
18 Queensland Government, ‘Queensland Health Rural and Remote Areas’ (Web page, 1 June 2014) 
<https://www.health.qld.gov.au/mass/subsidy-schemes/rural-remote>. 
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Reflecting on Figure 2 and Table 1, remote and very remote areas of Queensland are very large 
geographically, but population numbers are very low. In total, only 2.6 per cent of the population of 
Queensland live in remote and very remote areas. The practical reality of distance means that the 
necessary infrastructure to provide basic services such as access to schools, cannot always be 
shared between or centralised in country towns in remote and very remote areas. Place-based 
infrastructure investments to provide a universal suite of basic services across all remote and very 
remote areas of Queensland are thus caught up in the complex web of scarce resources, 
overlapping responsibilities between the three tiers of government, and rising community 
expectations in both cities and sparsely populated areas.  
 
 
Australia Queensland Very 
remote 
Remote Outer 
regional 
Inner 
regional 
Major 
cities 
Population size 23,401,886 4,703,197 52,725 71,329 667,634 941,836 2,957,011 
% of total population    100% 1.1% 1.5% 14.2% 20.0% 62.9% 
Median weekly 
household income 
$1,438 $1,402 $1,179 $1,417 $1,281 $1,172 $1,516 
Top 5 responses – 
industry of employment 
              
Accommodation 1.1% 1.4%   4.5% 2.3%     
Aged Care Residential 
Services 
2.0% 1.9%       2.5%   
Bauxite Mining 
 
10.0% 4.0%         
Beef Cattle Farming 0.4% 0.8% 14.8% 10.4%       
Cafes and Restaurants 2.2% 2.5%         2.6% 
Coal Mining 0.4% 1.2%   6.2% 3.3%     
Copper Ore Mining 0.1% 0.1%   5.6%       
Hospitals (except 
Psychiatric) 
3.9% 4.3% 4.9%   4.2% 4.0% 4.4% 
Local Government 
Administration 
1.3% 1.4% 9.7%         
Primary Education 2.2% 2.5% 3.7% 3.4% 2.9% 3.1% 2.3% 
Secondary Education 1.7% 1.7%       2.3%   
Supermarket and Grocery 
Stores 
2.4% 2.4%     2.7% 2.7% 2.3% 
Takeaway Food Services 1.8% 2.0%         2.0% 
Table 1 – Queensland population and industry of employment by Remoteness Area  
 
The simple fact is that infrastructure investments measured on a per capita basis, will always 
reveal paradoxical inequities: it is too large when compared to cities, but never enough. It is 
submitted that new infrastructure investments in remote and very remote areas, which are meant 
to drive economic prosperity cannot be justified unless the expenditure is relatively small and the 
returns sufficiently high in reference to a particular place or community, or unless the economic 
outcomes are scalable to larger centres or more people without significant further investment. 
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4 Contemporary regional development thinking 
The difficult balancing act between the allocation of scarce resources and community expectations 
is thus a tale of compromise, or perhaps (cynically) mere acceptance. In order to reach a 
compromise, stakeholders should participate in the process. In order to accept a compromise, 
stakeholders should have sufficient information to understand the position. 
It is set against this backdrop, that this Research Paper focuses on the key foundational principle 
of contemporary regional development in Australia, which is ‘partnerships, collaboration and 
cooperation’ between the government, the private sector and communities. The involvement of a 
range of stakeholders in regional development processes means there is greater potential for 
community ‘ownership’ of infrastructure, growth and innovation projects, and of the pooling of 
resources to reach mutually beneficial outcomes.19  
This Research Paper explores a community-led partnership-approach to development in remote 
and very remote areas that simultaneously forces and allows a community the freedom to define 
the particular value that is associated with ‘their place’. In doing so, the place-based value acts as 
the springboard for growth and innovation with the support/backing of the community.  
Partnerships, collaboration and cooperation have different meanings in general, and in a regional 
development context. They do not necessarily imply that decisions or control rights are shared. But 
it is fair to assume that each party will seek to achieve their own specific goals. As a result, each of 
them will have to weigh up the extent to which they are willing to compromise and give up some of 
their decision or control rights, or may find that they are in a position to obtain new decision-, 
control- or ownership-rights through the process. 
For example, in a regional development context, it may be entirely reasonable for the state to 
retain virtually all control and ownership rights over large key infrastructure projects. On the other 
hand, policy initiatives that rely on the actions of communities or individuals to plan and execute 
projects, may require nothing more from the state than clear governance and accountability 
processes and some form of facilitative funding. In the case of low cost projects aimed at 
addressing place-specific needs, problems or opportunities, it is submitted that there is merit in 
allowing communities and local government authorities the freedom to develop projects to suit their 
particular needs with little government intervention. Doing so gives voice to the value inherent in 
that particular place or community. What may be regarded as very low state expenditure in 
reference to the overall size of federal and state budgets, may constitute significant funding for 
remote and very remote communities if the funds address targeted problems, provide universal 
access to infrastructure and services, leverage the value proposition in a place, or assist in some 
way to address the increasing financial vulnerability of rural and remote councils.20  
Partnership-, collaboration- and cooperation-based regional development approaches that 
recognise that remote communities and their economic circumstances differ,21 have the potential to 
identify projects with high returns for communities, but not necessarily high overall costs for the 
state. State involvement could entail governance and oversight to ensure accountability, leaving 
remote communities free to forge local partnerships to solve localised mutual problems, drawing 
from the inherent value in a particular place.  
This Research Paper uses a case study approach to compare two different policy tools in a 
community-focused economic development strategy that was formulated in reference to the 
                                                     
19 House of Representatives Select Committee on Regional Development and Decentralisation, Parliament of Australia, Regions at the 
Ready: Investing in Australia’s Future (Report, June 2018) 19, 70–2; Commonwealth, Regions 2030: Unlocking Opportunity (Report, 
2017) 3. 
20 AEC, Assessment of the Financial Vulnerability of Rural and Remote Queensland Councils (Report, September 2018) 6–11. 
21 Productivity Commission, Remote Area Tax Concessions and Payments (Draft Report, August 2019) 7, 100. 
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historical and inherent agricultural place-value of a very remote area of Queensland. This strategy 
relies on the construction of new privately-owned infrastructure in the form of exclusion fencing, 
funded predominantly by landholders and facilitated by the state through the policy tools of a loan 
and grant funding.  
 
5 Purpose of the case studies 
The research undertakes two case studies on the construction of exclusion fences: 
 The loan-based Longreach Wild Dog Exclusion Fence Scheme (LES) and 
 The RAPAD Cluster Fencing Grant Scheme (RAPADCS). 
The purpose of the case studies is to analyse different conceptions of partnerships, collaboration 
and cooperation in reference to the application of two policy tools – loans and grant funding – in 
very remote area development in Queensland. Both policy tools are used to facilitate the 
construction of privately-owned infrastructure as the centrepiece of a community-led economic 
development plan. Overall, the net cost to the government of using the policy tools are low, but 
both have the potential to deliver high returns for very remote communities. 
The case studies: 
 Examine external factors that may impact economic development 
 Explain how the nature of infrastructure assets – what it does and what it is meant to achieve – 
plays a role in the practical application of partnership, cooperation and collaboration as the 
foundational principle of contemporary regional development 
 Explore different strategies to deal with private benefits that arise from government-funded, or 
government-facilitated privately-owned infrastructure 
 Contrast the management and financial risks borne by each of the parties to the loan and 
grant-funded infrastructure investment projects 
 Compare the overall cost of new infrastructure investments using loans and grant funding 
 Consider experiences of a business model that requires the establishment of a new legal 
entity to formalise a form of partnership, collaboration and cooperation 
 Examine different conceptions of partnerships, collaboration, cooperation and ‘clustering’. 
By considering the nature of an infrastructure asset and the funding model, and the appropriate 
level of practical, social and financial cooperation required to achieve the desired outcomes, the 
case studies provide insights into the role and efficacy of loans and co-funding grants in 
infrastructure investments in remote and very remote areas.  
This systematic approach to analyse the application of policy tools in the context of ‘partnerships, 
collaboration and cooperation’, serves as a blueprint for the assessment of other privately-owned 
infrastructure investment projects that have the potential to drive economic growth in communities. 
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6 Understanding the setting of the case studies 
Queensland is divided into nine regions, of which Central West Queensland is one.22 Central West 
Queensland is made up of a number of local government areas. Seven of these local government 
areas are grouped in what is commonly referred to as the RAPAD region.  
RAPAD is the acronym for the Central Western Remote Area Planning and Development Board, 
an ASIC listed, not-for-profit, regional development organisation owned by and representing the: 
 Barcaldine Regional Council 
 Barcoo Shire Council 
 Blackall-Tambo Regional Council 
 Boulia Shire Council 
 Diamantina Shire Council 
 Longreach Regional Council and  
 Winton Shire Council.23 
The RAPAD region makes up 23 per cent of the land area of Queensland, spanning 396,609 km² 
as depicted in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3 – The RAPAD region of Queensland 
  
                                                     
22 Queensland Government, ‘Queensland Regions’ (Web page, 8 May 2017) 
<https://www.business.qld.gov.au/industries/invest/regional-opportunities/queensland-regions>. 
23 RAPAD, RAPAD Annual Report 2018 – 2019 (Report, 2019) 4–5. 
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The population of the RAPAD region stands at approximately 10 500. The distribution of the 
population and the top industries of employment across each of the seven local government areas 
are presented in Table 2.24 
 
 
Barcaldine 
Regional 
Council 
Barcoo 
Shire 
Council 
Blackall-
Tambo 
Regional 
Council 
Boulia 
Shire 
Council 
Diamantina 
Shire 
Council 
Longreach 
Regional 
Council 
Winton 
Shire 
Council 
Total 
population = 
10,554 
       
Population size 2,865 272 1,903 429 291 3,660 1,134 
Median weekly 
household 
income 
$1,149 $1,187 $978 $1,271 $1,767 $1,276 $1,067 
Top 5 
responses – 
industry of 
employment 
       
Accommodation   4.20%     6.90%   4.20% 
Beef Cattle 
Farming 
26.90% 38.20% 25.60% 59.60% 30.50% 6.90% 18.10% 
Fuel Retailing         6.10%     
Hospitals (except 
Psychiatric) 
5.80%   5.20%     5.80% 5.50% 
Local Government 
Administration 
5.80% 34.70% 10.40% 15.70% 26.70% 5.20% 13.40% 
Primary Education   4.90% 3.10% 11.20%   3.10%   
Combined Primary 
and Secondary 
Education 
4.10%             
Pubs, Taverns and 
Bars 
        5.30%     
Road and Bridge 
Construction 
3.90%     4.50%       
Sheep-Beef Cattle 
Farming 
  3.50%         4.40% 
Supermarket and 
Grocery Stores 
    3.10% 2.20%   3.30%   
Table 2 – RAPAD region population and industry of employment 
 
  
                                                     
24 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Winton (S) (2016 Census QuickStat, Code LGA37400 (LGA), 23 October 2017); Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, Longreach (R) (2016 Census QuickStat, Code LGA34710 (LGA), 23 October 2017); Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
Diamantina (S) (2016 Census QuickStat, Code LGA32750 (LGA), 23 October 2017); Australian Bureau of Statistics, Boulia (S) 
(2016 Census QuickStat, Code LGA30900 (LGA), 23 October 2017); Australian Bureau of Statistics, Blackall-Tambo (R) (2016 
Census QuickStat, Code LGA30760 (LGA), 23 October 2017); Australian Bureau of Statistics, Barcoo (S) (2016 Census QuickStat, 
Code LGA30450 (LGA), 23 October 2017); Australian Bureau of Statistics, Barcaldine (R) (2016 Census QuickStat, Code 
LGA30410 (LGA), 23 October 2017). 
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These data presented in Table 2 reveal two key points: 
 In terms of employment, the region relies on the beef industry and jobs in local government 
and government services, particularly in schools and hospitals 
 None of the council areas have a population greater than 5,000. Therefore, there is no doubt 
that the entire region is classified as ‘very remote’. 
In reference to employment, the retention of decentralised government services in remote and very 
remote areas is a vexing question that is, in many ways, caught up in the place-based 
infrastructure development quagmire:  
 Can it be justified to expend or remove resources to have government facilities and staff 
present in very remote areas where low numbers of people are present to access services?  
Secondly, while employment in the beef cattle industry dominates, the sheep and wool industry 
has been part of the region since settlement.25 Over time, there has been a shift away from sheep, 
to beef production in Central West Queensland, and to larger properties with fewer families. 
Between 1991 and 2018, sheep numbers in the Central West have declined from an estimated 2 
million to 450,000.26 The dramatic decline started in 1991 when the Australian wool reserve price 
scheme was abandoned, removing the floor price of wool. As a result of the release of 
accumulated stocks and other factors, the industry collapsed.27 More recently, environmental 
factors – drought and wild dogs – have also contributed to a shift away from sheep. 
The climate, geography and vegetation of traditional ‘sheep country’ around Barcaldine, 
Longreach and Blackall are however well-suited to sheep and wool production. Its place-
value is linked to the agricultural history and place-potential of sheep and wool industries.  
Using the ‘value of a place’ as an important contribution that a community can make to partnership, 
collaboration and cooperation-focused regional development, it is easy to see how the key 
economic development strategy that is currently employed in the RAPAD region, which is to ‘Bring 
back the sheep’, is focused on specific place-value.28  
‘Bring back the sheep’ is an integrated RAPAD region economic development strategy that has two 
main objectives. Firstly, job creation. Secondly, improvements in the profitability of local 
businesses in order to drive economic prosperity across the region.  
The aspirational goals of the ‘Bring back the sheep’ strategy are to: 
 Increase sheep numbers to 1 million over ten years 
 Create more than 170 new jobs in the sheep industry 
 Increase regional gross margin by more than $13.6 million 
 Increase wages generate directly from shearing and crutching by $4.3 million.29 
  
                                                     
25 See, eg, Robert Mason and Rebecca Damjanovic, ‘The Start of it All? Heritage, Labour and the Environment in Regional Queensland’ 
(2018) 25(2) Queensland Review 208, 208–18. 
26 RAPAD, ‘Part 1 The Challenge’ (Web page) <https://notjustafence.org/>. 
27 See, eg, Malcolm Abbott. ‘Market Support Schemes and Their Interaction: The Case of the Wool Industry’ (2013) 52(3) Agriculture 
Economics Association of South Africa 63, 67–9. 
28 RAPAD, RAPAD Annual Report 2018 – 2019 (Report, 2019) 2; AJ Brown and JA Bellamy, ‘In the Shadow of Federalism: Dilemmas of 
Institutional Design in Australian Rural and Remote Regional Governance’ (2001) 16(2) Australasian Journal of Regional Studies 
151, 158. 
29 RAPAD, ‘If RAPAD EOI Successful One Million Sheep Put Back Into the West’ (Media Release, 17 August 2017); RAPAD, ‘RAPAD 
Releases EOI to Capture Continues Fencing Demand in the Region’ (Media Release, 22 May 2017).  
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6.1 Factors that impact economic development in Central West 
Queensland 
There are two significant factors that impact the economic development of the sheep industry in 
Central West Queensland: 
1. Drought and 
2. Wild dogs. 
The entire region has been drought declared since 2014. Drought is a key contributor to rural 
outmigration.30 In the RAPAD region:31 
Depopulation remains as the number one threat to the long term sustainability of all RAPAD communities and the 
industries they grow. As the population declines, so do services provided and as families with children leave town, 
lower numbers at the school mean fewer teachers are needed and if the teacher has children, more children leave, 
and so a negative social spiral starts. The flow-on effects are complex and intertwined, and once started, the 
momentum of a negative economic and social spiral is difficult to halt.  
While families are exiting the region aged care participants are moving in. Community exit has the effect of 
enhancing an already increasingly ageing demographic, while the existing and emergent workforce recedes.  
From 2011 to 2016, the population decline across the region, which can be attributed to the 
drought in large part, has been staggering. In the Longreach council area, the decrease was 13%; 
in Blackall-Tambo 15%; Barcoo shire 25%; and Winton 16%.32 The effects of the long and crippling 
drought has thus spilt over into all spheres of the community: cash poor graziers spend less and 
employ fewer people; small business’ turnovers reduce with resultant job losses and cash flow 
pressures for business owners; people who live in the region are forced to earn income outside of 
the region; mental health concerns, particularly for farmers; fewer people to volunteer in the 
community; school communities shrink.  
In so far as the drought is concerned, there is only one solution: it must rain in Central West 
Queensland.  
 
7 Wild dogs in Queensland 
The second environmental factor that plays a key role in agricultural prosperity in the region, is the 
presence of wild dogs, classified as a major pest. The livestock losses that primary producers 
suffer as a result of wild dog attacks, the cost of wild dog management on their properties, and the 
emotional impact of the constant threat of wild dogs on landholders and their families, are 
significant. While beef producers do suffer losses when calves are attacked, it is sheep producers 
who bear the brunt of the impact of wild dog predation, particularly during lambing season.33 
When compared to drought, wild dog predation is a more controllable risk with a range of short, 
medium and long term solutions. While a number of different techniques are available to manage 
                                                     
30 RAPAD, 2016 RAPAD Annual Report (Report, 2019) 4; Dana Kelly, ‘Beyond the Dust: Impact of Drought on Town Businesses in 
Central West Queensland and Some Solutions’ (Report, March 2018) 6, 8, 26. 
31 RAPAD, Submission to Independent Panel (Qld), Drought Program Review, (19 October 2018) 5. 
32 RAPAD, Submission to Independent Panel (Qld), Drought Program Review, (19 October 2018) 5. 
33 Bill Binks, Robert Kancans and Nyree Stenekes, Wild Dog Management 2010 to 2014: National Landholder Survey Results (Report, 
ABARES, Project ON-00072 Wild Dog Management in Australia; Milestone 4000246-0070, June 2015) 1, 2, 3, 6, 27; Nyree 
Stekees, Rob Kancans and Bill Binks, Pest Animal and Weed Management Survey (Research Report, ABARES, Report 17.5, May 
2017) 29. 
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the threat of wild dogs, exclusion fencing is the infrastructure foundation upon which the RAPAD 
region’s integrated economic development strategy to ‘Bring back the sheep’ is built.  
Wild dogs are a declared pest animal (class 2) and are thus covered by the Australian Pest Animal 
Strategy 2017–2027 that provides for best practice strategies to address the economic, 
environmental and social impact of pest animals. The strategy’s policy foundations relevant to wild 
dogs are: proactive, continuous investment; strategic action, coordination and leadership by 
stakeholders; shared responsibility by landholders, the community, industry and government for 
prevention and management to be effective.34  
 
7.1 Exclusion fences as infrastructure 
The World Bank views infrastructure as ‘shorthand for policies and investments that are spatially 
connective’.35 Gray describes infrastructure as ‘the structural elements of the economy that provide 
basic services to industry and households’, and go on to state that infrastructure can be 
categorised as economic infrastructure or social infrastructure. In defining economic infrastructure, 
Gray states that it usually forms part of a network, and is an input to production processes.36  
It is submitted that exclusion fences form part of a network of physical barriers used to protect 
large parts of public and private land against a pest. A cluster fence is an application of an 
exclusion fence that creates a physical barrier around a number of properties working together.  
As large scale, multi-stakeholder, coordinated programs are needed to address the risk associated 
with wild dog predation, and due to the significant economic, social and environmental impact of 
wild dogs as pests, exclusion fences are thus regarded as infrastructure assets that have wide-
ranging community benefits, even if the infrastructure itself is located on private land. 
Exclusion fences are an important wild dog management technique in Queensland due to the size 
of individual properties. National landholder surveys about wild dog management reveal that the 
median size of properties in Queensland is 21,039 hectares (all properties, not only sheep-focused 
properties), compared to 4,639 hectares in South Australia and 1,092 hectares in New South 
Wales.37 By way of example, the size of some of the properties that currently take part in the 
RAPAD cluster fencing grant scheme (one of the case studies in this Research Paper) is set out in 
Table 3.  
The time involved in the management of wild dogs remains the largest prohibiting factor for 
landholders to effectively protect their properties. Distance extends the time it takes for a 
landholder to use other wild dog management techniques such as baiting, trapping and shooting 
over the length and breadth of their property. Exclusion fences solve that problem to a large extent 
if wild dogs are eradicated within enclosed areas.38 
 
  
                                                     
34 Commonwealth, Australian Pest Animal Strategy 2017–2027 (Invasive Plants and Animals Committee, Department of Agriculture and 
Water Resources, 2017) 2, 3. 
35 World Bank, Reshaping Economic Geography (Report, 2009) 23. 
36 Harriet Gray, Evolution of Infrastructure Regulation in Australia (Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, Working Paper No. 
1/July 2009, ACCC/AER Working Paper Series) 2. 
37 Bill Binks, Robert Kancans and Nyree Stenekes, Wild Dog Management 2010 to 2014: National Landholder Survey Results (Report, 
Project ON-00072 Wild Dog Management in Australia; Milestone 4000246-0070, ABARES, June 2015) 10, 11. 
38 Bill Binks, Robert Kancans and Nyree Stenekes, Wild Dog Management 2010 to 2014: National Landholder Survey Results (Report, 
Project ON-00072 Wild Dog Management in Australia; Milestone 4000246-0070, ABARES, June 2015) 25. 
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Number of 
landholders (LH) 
in the cluster 
Size of the cluster 
(ha): 
 
LH 1 (ha) 
 
LH 2 (ha) 
 
LH 3 (ha) 
 
LH 4 (ha) 
 
LH 5 (ha) 
4 41,210 18,772 7,165 6,743 8,530 
 
4 39,016 11,574 7,133 6,296 14,097 
 
3 16,454 4,851 7,135 3,823 
  
3 78,117 10,900 25,169 41,700 
  
4 41,104 13,938 13,589 9,854 4,166 
 
5 47,232 13,267 22,178 5,845 2,999 5,839 
3 31,969 11,263 9,940 10,786 
  
Table 3 – Examples of property sizes in the RAPAD cluster fencing scheme 
 
While exclusion fences require sizeable upfront capital investments, the overall return on 
investment is regarded as high. Exclusion fences also have indirect benefits such as reducing 
emotional stress about farm business viability and workers’ safety and reducing distress on the 
part of landholders who have to destroy mauled livestock.39 More directly, if wool growers are able 
to assert better control over wild dogs on their properties, they will have better and more 
predictable productivity, in turn offering stable and predictable employment, and more cash to 
spend in their communities. Spending less time managing the threat of wild dogs, mean they have 
more time available for other areas of their farming operations.40  
Through two separate and differently structured exclusion fencing schemes, the RAPAD region 
aims to protect close on 2 million hectares from wild dog predation.41  
Both schemes are important from a rural and regional development perspective in Queensland, as: 
 The Queensland government provides the funding mechanisms for both schemes 
 State and local governments have an important regulatory role to play in biosecurity, and wild 
dog management is a biosecurity matter 
 For the most part, wild dogs impact privately held land. When government resources are used 
to address wild dog predation, private benefits arise in the hands of landholders 
 The extent to which it is justified for the government to provide private benefits in order to 
address a national problem, creates questions of policy that ought to be settled before 
resources are allocated towards achieving this goal 
 The sheer number of pests present in Australia, when coupled with limited government 
resources, necessitate a more strategic risk-based approach to pest management.42 
  
                                                     
39 See, eg, Bill Binks, Robert Kancans and Nyree Stenekes, Wild Dog Management 2010 to 2014: National Landholder Survey Results 
(Report, Project ON-00072 Wild Dog Management in Australia; Milestone 4000246-0070, ABARES, June 2015) 27. 
40 Part 2 The Solution (Web Page) <https://notjustafence.org/>. 
41 RAPAD, 2016 RAPAD Annual Report (Report, 2019) 11; Premier’s Office (Qld), ‘Longreach Exclusion Fencing to Review Sheep and 
Wool Industry’ (Media Release, 1 December 2016). 
42 Commonwealth, National Framework for the Management of Established Pests and Disease of National Significance (National 
Biosecurity Committee, 2016) 2–3. 
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7.2 Current wild dog responsibilities 
In reference to the two case studies presented in this Research Paper, the respective wild dog-
related responsibilities of landholders, the Queensland government and local governments are 
important. These are presented in Table 4 (author’s interpretation). Reflecting on the results of the 
case studies, it is fair to say that both exclusion fencing schemes allow landholders, the 
Queensland government, RAPAD and the Longreach Regional Council to meet their respective 
responsibilities. The ways in which they cooperate to do so, are significant. 
 
Landholders Queensland government Local governments 
Control and manage established 
pest animals to mitigate, as 
necessary, the impacts on their own 
assets, or as required by regulation 
controls 
Build coordination and 
collaboration in pest animal 
management at local, regional 
and state and territory levels 
Exercise statutory duties to 
encourage responsible pest 
animal management 
Take reasonable steps to minimise 
the impacts of established pest 
animals on other landholders, 
particularly through participation in 
programs of collective industry or 
community-led action, and on 
people and the broader 
environment 
Encourage responsible pest 
animal management by providing 
a suitable institutional, legislative 
and regulatory framework; 
developing and implementing 
effective policies and programs, 
and where appropriate, providing 
positive support measures (not 
necessarily financial) to 
landholders 
Manage pest animal problems on 
local government land in a 
responsible way, in co-operation 
with other landholders 
Cooperate with and plan pest 
animal management activities jointly 
with neighbours, as well as state, 
territory and local governments, 
within a landscape scale/cross-
tenure approach 
Provide leadership, coordination 
and resources for research, 
evaluation, advisory services and 
education programs about pest 
animals 
Assist with the coordination of 
community pest animal 
management programs 
Apply knowledge and skills to 
improve pest animal management 
and understand the need to use 
multiple approaches (e.g. chemical, 
physical and biological) to prevent 
pest animals from adapting to 
existing 
Encourage the development of 
effective pest animal 
management strategies at local, 
regional, state and territory and 
national scales 
Support local initiatives and 
directions where they are 
representative of the Australian 
Pest Animal Strategy direction and 
regional and local priorities 
 Provide support where there is 
sustained collective action to 
manage an established pest 
animal by an industry or 
community in their state or 
territory 
Assist with data collection and 
information exchange 
 Support the collection of pest 
animal data and information, that 
can be collated nationally 
Develop and adopt ‘Good 
Neighbour’ policies, where 
appropriate, to help reduce the 
spread and impacts of high risk 
pest animal species 
Table 4 – Responsibilities for wild dog management 
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7.3 The role of the Queensland Feral Pest Initiative (QFPI) 
In Queensland, the Queensland Feral Pest Initiative (QFPI) is the vehicle for state support to 
regional communities for the construction of cluster fences and control of invasive plants and pest 
animals. The QFPI Oversight Group oversees the development and implementation of projects 
aimed at invasive plants and pest animal management, and comprise:  
 AgForce 
 Queensland Farmers Federation 
 Local Government Association of Queensland 
 NRM Regions Queensland 
 Queensland Conservation Council 
 Wildlife Preservation Society of Queensland 
 Centre for Invasive Species Solutions 
 Department of Agriculture and Fisheries (DAF) 
 Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Energy (DNRME) 
 Department of Environment and Science (DES).43 
Since 2015, the Queensland government has committed $19.74 million for the construction of 
cluster fences on private property, and that amount is complemented with $13 million from the 
Commonwealth. These funds are distributed through the QFPI. To date, three rounds of the QFPI 
cluster fencing scheme have been completed. The QFPI scheme is targeted at drought affected 
areas with sheep and wool producers and seeks to bring large numbers of sheep back to these 
areas. The rationale behind focusing cluster fencing on the sheep industry specifically, is that the 
sheep industry has strong economic multipliers with huge economic and social benefits.44 The 
place-value associated with sheep and wool production is therefore relevant in the QFPI scheme 
and in the RAPAD region’s ‘Bring back the sheep’ economic development strategy. 
 
7.4 The cost of the wild dog problem 
The QFPI’s initiatives have clear funding implications for the State. It is one example of the way 
that wild dog predation has wide economic, social and environmental implications. Exactly how 
costly wild dog predation is for the Commonwealth, states and territories, local governments and 
landholders, is difficult to determine.  
Wild dog management costs are not separated from other vertebrae initiatives in state expenditure, 
and the social costs and opportunity losses associated with the in-kind contribution that 
landholders make to manage the risk, are not recorded.45 Similarly, data about tax deductible 
expenses that primary producers and primary production businesses incur to manage wild dogs 
are not recorded. Overall, it is estimated that invasive plants and pest animals cost Queensland 
                                                     
43 Queensland Government, ‘Queensland Feral Pest Initiative’ (Web Page, 15 March 2019) <https://www.daf.qld.gov.au/business-
priorities/biosecurity/invasive-plants-animals/animals/qld-feral-pest-initiative>. 
44 Department of Agriculture and Fisheries (QLD), Queensland Feral Pest Initiative: Funding Round 3 Applicant Guidelines and How to 
Apply (2018) 2. 
45 Santhi Wicks et al, ‘An integrated assessment of the impact of wild dogs in Australia (Research Report no. 14.4, Department of 
Agriculture, ABARES, April 2014) 7; L Hewitt, Major Economic Costs Associated with Wild Dogs in the Queensland Grazing Industry 
(Report, AgForce, September 2009) 11. 
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over $600 million annually in lost production and in pest management costs.46 Research conducted 
by AgForce estimated that in 2008/09, wild dogs cost Queensland $67 million,47 as set out in Table 
5. 
 
Stakeholder Cost category $ 
Queensland State 
Government 
Department of Employment, Economic 
Development and Innovation 
Queensland Parks and Wildlife 
 
 
$1,754,000 
Local and State 
governments 
State Wild Dog Barrier Fence  
$1,870,316 
Local government Including bounties and management program $2,623,543 
Sheep/goat producers Livestock losses $16,950,000 
 Wild dog management $2,248,642 
Cattle producers Calf livestock losses $22,840,000 
 Product loss due to dog-bitten cattle (saleyards) $1,036,914 
 Product loss due to dog-bitten cattle (processors) $1,031,441 
 Neospora caninum $3,143,536 
 Hydatids $2,057,685 
 Wild dog management costs $11,460,498 
Total  $67,016,575 
Table 5 – Cost of wild dogs in Queensland 2008/09  
 
At a farm level, landholder surveys reveal that an average of close on $20,000 and 77 person-days 
are spent annually per agricultural business on pest animal and weed management activities.48 
The Northern Territory Cattleman’s Association estimate that wild dogs cost Northern Territory 
producers around $60 million annually.49  
As depicted in Table 4, local government authorities stand under an obligation to actively manage 
pests. These actions have cost implications that require funding. In the case of Longreach, the 
Longreach Regional Council levies a ‘Control of Pests Special Charge’ on all rural land greater 
than 25 hectares of $1.94 per hectare. The special charge is used to fund a coordinated wild dog 
baiting program on council and private land, which serves as another example of partnerships, 
collaboration and cooperation. The budgeted cost of the program for the 2019–20 year is $352,000 
derived from a list of 126 properties.50 The total income from the Property Pest Management and 
Environmental Levy in the 2018–19 year was $258,000, or around 2.5 per cent of all rates, levies 
and charges income for the year.51 Reflecting on all these data, wild dog predation has a direct 
economic impact on a range of stakeholders. 
 
                                                     
46 Department of Agriculture and Fisheries (QLD), Queensland Feral Pest Initiative: Funding Round 3 Applicant Guidelines and How to 
Apply (2018) 2. 
47 L Hewitt, Major Economic Costs Associated with Wild Dogs in the Queensland Grazing Industry (Report, AgForce, September 2009) 
19. 
48 Nyree Stekees, Rob Kancans and Bill Binks, Pest Animal and Weed Management Survey (Research Report 17.5, Australian Bureau 
of Agricultural and Resources Economic and Sciences, May 2017) 2. 
49 Courtney Fowler and Michelle Stanley, ‘Wild Dog Numbers On the Rise and Costing Northern Cattle Producers Millions Each Year’ 
ABC Rural (online at 9 April 2019) <https://www.abc.net.au/news/rural/2019-04-09/wa-pastoralists-wild-dog-fight/10979476>. 
50 Longreach Regional Council, Budget 2019-2020 (Confirmed Minutes, Budget Meeting, 29 July 2019) 23–5. 
51 Longreach Regional Council, 2018-2019 Annual Report (Report) 59. 
 Place-value economic development in remote Queensland 25 
 
7.5 Addressing the private nature of wild dog management 
The QFPI cluster fencing scheme and the Longreach Regional Council baiting program are 
examples where government funding is used to combat wild dogs on private property. This position 
raises the question of whether it is justified and equitable to do so. One argument in the affirmative 
is that wild dogs have significant negative economic implications for whole communities: the losses 
that graziers suffer affect their business viability that in turn decreases their spending in local 
economies, and smaller flocks mean fewer sustainable local jobs in categories such as shearing.  
Another argument that justifies government spending on private properties, is that wild dogs roam. 
As a result, the efforts of one landholder to protect their property against attacks will be ineffective 
in reference to the larger surrounding geographical area, if dogs simply move to an adjoining 
property or onto public land.52  
Similarly, state and local government authorities employ a range of wild dog management 
techniques on public land to address the risk of wild dog predation. For example, the QFPI 
coordinates aerial baiting, on-ground baiting, trapping and funds trappers.53 But if private 
landholders do not protect their properties at least to the same extent, then public monies spent to 
protect public land will have little effect.  
Therefore, spending public monies to address the wild dog problem on privately-owned land is a 
sensible, effective and integrated solution that matches the roaming nature of this pest animal. The 
scale of public land that must be protected against wild dog predation in Central West Queensland 
is a lot smaller than the scale of private land. If scaled wild dog management outcomes are to be 
achieved, efforts must be directed at private land.  
The national framework for the management of pests makes it clear that the policy approach to 
pest management is difficult because the affected assets are privately-owned. Any government-
funded pest management on private land holds private benefits for the private landholder.54 These 
private benefits are measurable. A simple record of changes in livestock losses as a result of 
government expenditure is a good starting point, together with cost savings if landholders do not 
have to incur the same or all of the pest management costs, and the economic advantages of 
increases in lambing and lamb survival rates.  
To argue that state resources spent on techniques such as baiting and trapping leave no lasting 
benefit on private land, other than fewer wild dogs being present, may have some merit in the 
context of the price that a landholder may get when they sell their property. But it is an entirely 
different matter if the state provides funding for exclusion fences on private properties. Exclusion 
fences are capital in nature and enhance the value of private property beyond a reduction in wild 
dog numbers. Government-funded or facilitated exclusion fences that are constructed on private 
land, are private assets. It is the landholder that reaps the benefits in the long run, because the 
fence enhances the property value. 
 
                                                     
52 Santhi Wicks et al, An integrated assessment of the impact of wild dogs in Australia (Research Report, Report no. 14.4, Department 
of Agriculture, ABARES, April 2014) 43–4. 
53 Department of Agriculture and Fisheries (QLD), Queensland Feral Pest Initiative: Funding Round 3 Applicant Guidelines and How to 
Apply (2018) 2. 
54 Commonwealth, National Framework for the Management of Established Pests and Disease of National Significance (National 
Biosecurity Committee, 2016) 4, 6. 
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8 Co-investment strategies in wild dog prevention 
infrastructure 
8.1 The QFPI Grant Scheme 
The QFPI scheme referred to above, is a grant scheme that subsidises the cost of cluster fences 
on private land. Principle 8 of the Australian Pest Management Strategy states that the cost of pest 
animal management should be borne by those who benefit from its management. The private 
landholder benefits, and by implication, should pay. But the state also benefits as the roaming 
nature of wild dogs requires an integrated and geographically spread out response over public land 
and privately-owned land.  
As a matter of principle, the Australian Pest Management Strategy states that governments may 
co-invest where there is a net public benefit from any such intervention.55 The QFPI scheme is a 
co-investment grant scheme. The government’s contribution to a cluster fence is capped at $2,700 
per kilometre,56 budgeted to equate to about 35 per cent of the overall investment to construct the 
cluster fence.57  
In the case of the QFPI scheme, participation is limited to clusters of neighbouring graziers who 
work together to enclose their properties and apply for grant funding jointly. The private benefits 
that arise from the government’s co-investment in the cluster fence are thus diluted by the 
participation of more than one landholder.58 Leveraging grant funding or subsidies against more 
than one property therefore, holds important lessons and opportunities for other infrastructure 
projects that involve private ownership.  
As to whether the scheme has a net public benefit, the QFPI scheme guidelines and extensive 
modelling by RAPAD present strong evidence of the region-wide potential of cluster fences over a 
five year period.  
Therefore, the QFPI scheme: 
 Uses grant funding as a policy tool to encourage landholders to engage with more long term 
capital intensive solutions to pest management 
 Is premised on cooperation and collaboration between groups of landholders that reduce the 
criticism of individual private benefits that may arise from grant funding private assets 
 Relies on significant private investment. The grant funding is insufficient to fund the 
construction cost of a fence. Landholders are required to make co-contributions roughly 
double that of the government, as discussed in detail as part of the case studies. 
As a policy tool, the grant funding is effective in achieving place-value rural adjustment in Central 
West Queensland by returning large scale sheep and wool industries to the region. 
Following on from the theme of this Research Paper that contemporary regional development 
involves partnerships, collaboration and cooperation, the QFPI scheme revolves around the 
economic development concept of a ‘cluster’ of grazier. As explained above, the grant scheme is 
premised on graziers with adjoining land working together to apply for funding to construct a fence 
                                                     
55 Commonwealth, Australian Pest Animal Strategy 2017–2027 (Invasive Pants and Animals Committee, Department of Agriculture and 
Water Resources, 2017) 3. 
56 Department of Agriculture and Fisheries (QLD), Queensland Feral Pest Initiative: Funding Round 3 Applicant Guidelines and How to 
Apply (2018) 10. 
57 See detailed analysis in Part 17 of this Research Paper. 
58 Department of Agriculture and Fisheries (QLD), Queensland Feral Pest Initiative: Funding Round 3 Applicant Guidelines and How to 
Apply (2018) 10. 
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to enclose their properties together. The QFPI scheme also uses a number of other conceptions of 
partnerships, collaboration and cooperation, articulated in the QFPI Round 3 Guidelines, examples 
of which are presented in Table 6.59  
 
Page 
number60 
Form of partnerships, collaboration and cooperation 
5, 12 Leveraging co-investment or co-contributions by landholders and the government in cash and in-
kind (on the part of landholders) 
5, 11 Projects must be developed on a regional basis, must prove outcomes at a regional level, as well 
as proof of regional acceptance and support for the scheme 
5, 6, 7 Projects must include diverse stakeholders, which may include primary producers, local 
governments, regional groups, Landcare, wild dog committees, catchment management, local 
training and employment organisations, Indigenous groups, environmental organisations and 
other community groups 
6 Applications must demonstrate the level of contributions from landholders, land managers, 
industry, local governments, local industry and other project partners including the ongoing level 
of stakeholder and public support 
6 Applications must demonstrate how the project will be managed locally in the short-term and into 
the long-term to ensure outcomes are maintained 
6 Applications should include significant participation of relevant local and regional stakeholders 
10 Funding is limited to clusters  
Table 6 – Partnerships, collaboration and cooperation in the QFPI grant scheme 
 
8.2 Alternative strategies 
Whether similar co-funded infrastructure development projects would be able to achieve the same 
neatly delineated outcomes to distinguish between private and public benefit would depend on the 
nature of the infrastructure, the extent of the private benefits, the presence of free riding, and how 
(and if) the public would derive direct benefits from the particular asset. For example, comparing 
the construction of a cluster fence to a telecommunication infrastructure asset such as a mobile 
telecommunication satellite base station, co-funded by a landholder and grant funding: 
 That is connected to an open national telecommunications network 
 Primarily purchased to provide reliable connectivity for agtech applications on the private 
property 
 Located on private property, but close enough to public roads to facilitate access to the 
national telecommunications network for passers-by 
there are distinct differences between the two outcomes.  
These differences, detailed in Table 7, illustrate which type of infrastructure investments projects 
may be suitable for grant funding or grant co-funding: projects which do not require the ongoing 
intervention of another private sector participant, projects with quantifying freeriding.  
  
                                                     
59 Department of Agriculture and Fisheries (QLD), Queensland Feral Pest Initiative: Funding Round 3 Applicant Guidelines and How to 
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60 Reference is to the page number in the QFPI Round 3 Guideline. 
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Cluster fence Mobile satellite base station 
The number of free riders is known, being 
landholders on neighbouring properties 
The number of free riders is unknown, and may 
include individuals who do not reside in the area, 
and are merely passing through the area 
There is a regulatory mechanism to deal with free 
riders in the form of the Neighbourhood Disputes 
(Dividing Fences and Trees) Act 2011 (Qld) 
The nature of telecommunication implies ‘mass use’ 
and cross-subsidisation of infrastructure costs. It is 
not possible for the landholder to identify who the 
free riders might be 
Most graziers have the knowledge, skill and 
experience to construct fences 
Telecommunication equipment is specialised and 
not the usual type of infrastructure or capital asset 
used as part of a grazing business  
Fence maintenance does not require specialist 
knowledge and training 
The maintenance of telecommunication is technical 
in nature 
Long term asset with a longer life cycle Shorter lifecycle, technology advances may require 
continuous upgrades 
Is a standalone asset that fulfils a function on its own Needs a connection to a national grid in order to 
operate. Neither the landholder not the state owns 
or operates the relevant grid 
Does not require the intervention of a service 
provider 
Relies on a third party telecommunication provider 
to operate 
Table 7 – Comparison of cluster fence and mobile satellite base station co-investments 
 
The observations set out in Table 7 explain why infrastructure investments that relate to universal 
access to services such as telecommunication and energy require careful consideration of: 
 The extent to which the government may have to fund ongoing maintenance if landholders 
don’t, when communities or the general public rely on the infrastructure 
 The extent to which landholders may seek commercial benefit from the infrastructure beyond 
their traditional or ‘usual’ business through models such as user-pay, in which event the 
private benefit to them may be too large to justify co-funding through grants 
 The extent to which a commercial third party has to be a necessary participant, for the 
infrastructure to operate. 
It may be that these type of infrastructure investments are more suited to traditional private-public-
partnerships. Or, if the investments relate to basic services in a remote or very remote region that 
cannot be cross-subsidised through traditional private sector investments or private-public-
partnerships, it may be better for a local government to invest in the project directly. An example of 
the latter, is the $80,000 direct investment made by the Winton Shire council in two 4GX Satellite 
Small Cell systems from a national telecommunications company. The two systems were installed 
at Lark Quarry and Corfield, both remote tourist locations in the shire, to provide the community 
with mobile coverage and to serve the tourist route, as tourism is an important industry in the shire 
and region. The telecommunications company maintains and operates the two stations as part of 
their nation grid at no further charge to the Winton Shire Council, and enables connectivity for 
locals and tourists.61 The type of asset, the way it is used, and the user group, therefore fits with 
the ownership and funding model that involves only a local government and a large 
telecommunications provider, on commercial contract terms. 
  
                                                     
61 Women at the Well, ‘Consultation Report: Realising the RAPAD Big Vision’ (Report, RAPAD, June 2019) 12 
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8.3 Private benefit of a grant-funded exclusion fence 
The QFPI cluster fencing scheme reduces the capital investment required by a group of graziers to 
construct a cluster fence by at least 35 percent as discussed later on in this Research Paper. The 
nature of this particular grant scheme reduces spending on the part of the graziers, and it provides 
them with private benefits. 
It is entirely possible to remove the private benefits that arise from the grant funding by simply 
eliminating the grant altogether and replacing it with another form of funding support that does not 
involve a group of landholders working together. One option is to use government loan funding as 
the policy tool to encourage landholders to construct exclusion fences. Loans must be repaid. As 
long as a government loan is repaid, the private benefits from this funding source are neutral. 
However, there are two significant problems in using government loan funding to build exclusion 
fences. Firstly, in reference to Central West Queensland, the protracted drought has placed 
graziers under significant cash flow and financial pressure. Many primary producers access Farm 
Household Allowances and concessional drought loans. It is likely that they will not qualify for new 
debt financing, even if there is every possibility that an exclusion fence will increase profitability. 
Their debt ratios are simply too high, and cash flow too low. Not having an exclusion fence on their 
property, means that wild dog management initiatives around their land will be less effective, which 
in turn, has a direct and negative impact on neighbouring graziers and on the state.  
In response to these factors, the state can advance a loan directly to a grazier to build an exclusion 
fence. If the loan is made to a grazier in financial distress, there is a risk of default. If the state 
doesn’t recover the debt, significant private benefits accrue to the landholder. From a policy 
perspective, the state must therefore consider its credit risk in order to deal with the private 
benefits that may arise from direct loans.  
Secondly, the benefits associated with working together in groups to cooperate in different ways to 
address the risk of wild dog predation are lost when single graziers construct exclusion fences in 
isolation, as compared to cluster fences. Drawing on the central theme of this Research Paper – 
partnerships, collaboration and cooperation – policy solutions such as integrated community 
engagement and group-based learning go a long way to raise awareness of wild dog management 
strategies among graziers and to foster collaboration among graziers. Cluster fencing facilitates 
practical cooperation and cooperation.  
Having said that, surveys of landowners about wild dog management reveal the significant 
presence of groups or syndicates without the requirement to cooperate formally. For example, in 
the 2017 Pest Animal and Weed Management Survey, 63.7% of those surveyed were in a group 
with a pest animal management plan and 51.8% in a group with a weed management plan.62 
Another study, based on structured interviews with thirty representatives of wild dog management 
groups across Australia, revealed that most groups operate on an informal basis.63 Therefore, by 
leveraging from these groups, and integrating the matters of mutual concern into more structured 
collaborative forums led locally or by State governments, would achieve the same collaborative 
benefits, but would require more active participation from different levels of government to 
implement than an approach that requires graziers to self-organise. 
  
                                                     
62 Nyree Stekees, Rob Kancans and Bill Binks, Pest Animal and Weed Management Survey (Research Report, ABARES, Report 17.5, 
May 2017) 38. 
63 Saan Ecker et al, Participatory wild dog management: Views and Practices of Australian Wild Dog Management Groups (Report, 
ABARES, Project ON-00072 Wild Dog Management in Australia, Milestone 4000246-0060, May 2015) 1. 
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9 An overview of the case studies 
The remainder of this Research Paper is devoted to case studies of the two policy tools employed 
to facilitate the construction of exclusion fences in the RAPAD region – a long term loan and grant 
funding – and how these relate to contemporary regional development mantras of partnerships, 
collaboration and cooperation.  
Within the context of the case studies, loans and grant funding may be regarded as instruments in 
short- and medium-term rural adjustment schemes, ‘intended to induce the re-deployment of 
labour, movement out of an industry by some, usually smaller firms (farm businesses), and the 
business and/or physical restructuring of the remaining firms. An explicit goal of the programs is 
the creation of a sector in which most of the remaining firms operate efficiently and more 
importantly, self-sufficiently’.64  
Both the Longreach Wild Dog Exclusion Fence Scheme and the RAPAD Cluster Fencing Scheme 
are aimed at structural adjustments in the agriculture sector in Central West Queensland through a 
shift from cattle to sheep and wool production. Both schemes recognise the place-value of the 
sheep and wool industry in the region and serve as the catalyst for the region-wide economic 
development strategy ‘Bring back the sheep’, aimed at job creation and economic growth.  
 
9.1 The loan-based Longreach Wild Dog Exclusion Fence Scheme 
(LES) 
The Longreach Wild Dog Exclusion Fence Scheme (LES) demonstrates social innovation and 
partnerships in a very remote area. The vision for the LES came from a local grazier Mr John de 
Kloot.65 The Longreach Regional Council (LRC) took up his idea, demonstrating place-value-
focused leadership, to approach the Queensland Government with a business plan for an $18 
million, 20-year long term loan to fund the construction of exclusion fences on private property. The 
loan from the Queensland Treasury Corporation (QTC) to the LRC was approved on 1 December 
2016.66 The scheme commenced on 1 July 2017.67 The LES is thus a citizen-inspired and local 
government-led program.68  
The LES is targeted at graziers who have been impacted by drought and wild dog predation and 
who are reluctant to take on further debt financing to construct exclusion fences on their properties. 
The purpose of the scheme is to make it possible for these graziers to access funding through the 
LRC to construct exclusion fences on their properties, and to operationalise the expense through 
their rates payable to the LRC. The LRC therefore acts as a funding agency for graziers, but bear 
the debt repayment risk associated with the loan. Participating landholders incur no debt financing, 
only the obligation to pay special rates associated with the construction of each fence.69  
Compared to a direct loan from the state to a landholder, the LES largely removes the Queensland 
government’s risk in so far as private benefits to a landholder go if they default, as the LRC is 
responsible to repay the loan. 
  
                                                     
64 Geoff Cockfield and Linda Botterill, ‘Rural Adjustment Schemes: Juggling Politics, Welfare and Markets’ (2006) 65(2) Australian 
Journal of Public Administration 70, 70. 
65 Longreach Regional Council, Longreach Wild Dog Exclusion Fence Scheme (Minutes, Ordinary Meeting, 8 December 2016) 5. 
66 Premier’s Office (Qld), ‘Longreach Exclusion Fencing to Review Sheep and Wool Industry’ (Media Release, 1 December 2016). 
67 Longreach Regional Council, Budget 2018-2019 (Unconfirmed Minutes, Budget Meeting, 5 July 2018) 110–11. 
68 Saan Ecker et al, Participatory wild dog management: Views and Practices of Australian Wild Dog Management Groups (Report, 
ABARES, Project ON-00072 Wild Dog Management in Australia, Milestone 4000246-0060, May 2015) 10. 
69 Andrew Perkins ‘Fencing in Regional Economic Development’ (Newsletter, Hall Chadwick Association, Autumn 2017) 3. 
 Place-value economic development in remote Queensland 31 
 
The aspirational goal of the LES is to stimulate the local economy by: 
 Protecting a further 900,000 hectares, or 22 per cent of the Longreach region from wild dogs 
 Increasing sheep numbers by 200,000 over five years (40% increase) 
 Adding 130 jobs to the region – with a focus on shearing jobs – to expand the population by 
around 500.70  
The LES financing model was based on a regional infrastructure scheme applied to the rollout of 
electrification in regional areas in the 1960s and 1970s. Through that scheme, the cost of the 
regional SWER (single-wire earth return) lines was paid for by local councils and recovered 
through a special rate charge, thus enabling isolated landholders to move from diesel-generated to 
reliable energy without spending the upfront capital investment to do so.71 
The LES is different from the QFPI grant scheme. It is not cluster-based, but still requires the 
enclosure of an area on a property or the entirety of a property. That said, there was no restriction 
in the LES to prevent groups of landholders from applying to this competitive scheme.  
The LES entails the LRC funding the construction of an exclusion fence on the property of a 
successful applicant, with material that is sourced by the LRC to use economies of scale to lower 
procurement costs. Overall, the LES will cover the cost of 2,500 kilometres of exclusion fencing 
over 63 properties. From planning to execution, the overall cost of the plan increased from 
$17,967,965 to $18,603,225.72 
On completion, the exclusion fence constructed on each property is transferred to the landholder 
under a special rates agreement and the landholder effectively pays off the loan from the QTC to 
the LRC through the special rates (in addition to their normal rates). The LRC is able to impose a 
special rate on participating landholders through the regulatory mechanisms of the Local 
Government Act 2009 (Qld),73 and the Local Government Regulation 2012 (Qld).74 
The special rate is imposed over a twenty year period, which is the same as the period of the QTC 
loan. The payback terms of the special rate mirror the timeline used to predict the aspirational 
growth in sheep numbers through the scheme, being five years. It takes time to restock and build 
flocks. On that basis, successful LES applicants make no special rate payments in year 1 and year 
2, and interest-only special rate payments in years 3 to 5. Thereafter, principle and interest 
repayments are made over 15 years.75  
Several different aspects of the LES draw on regional policy mantras of partnerships, collaboration 
and cooperation: The LRC consulted widely with graziers and the community before applying for 
the loan. Hence, the LRC’s business plan was based on the support and participation of 63 
landholders. The LES is the outcome of an intensive discussion at council level regarding the most 
appropriate strategy that will make the greatest impact on the region’s economy.76 Through the 
scheme, landholders and the local government work together to collect data about wild dog 
management. All participants must provide MERI (Monitor, Evaluation, Reporting and 
Improvement) data. As a requirement of the scheme, all applicants must have submitted a 
Property Management Plan, which is a collation of a weed map and Property Pest Management 
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Plan. This serves as an instrument against which the LRC is able to meet its regulatory 
responsibilities for pest management as discussed in part 7 of this Research Paper.77 
 
9.2 The RAPAD Cluster Fencing Grant Scheme (RAPADCS) 
The RAPAD Cluster Fencing Grant Scheme (RAPADCS) is administered through the QFPI grant 
scheme discussed in part 8 of this Research Paper.  
RAPAD is the collaborating agency that acts as a conduit between the QFPI and clusters of 
landholders working together to apply for the grant funding to construct cluster fences. RAPAD has 
successfully applied for funding in all three rounds of the QFPI cluster fencing grant schemes from 
2015 to 2019, receiving $9.85 million in grant funding as follows: 
 Round 1  $5.25 million 
 Round 2  $2.1 million 
 Round 3  $2.5 million.78  
During Round 1 and Round 2 of the scheme, 23 clusters were approved for funding. The 
RAPADCS case study focuses on Round 1 and Round 2.  
Across all three rounds, 138 landholders participated in the scheme, 3,376 kilometres were fenced, 
protecting 1.9 million hectares.79 
As a QFPI requirement, the RAPADCS was only open to groups of landholders who sought to 
enclose their adjoining properties or significant parts of their adjoining properties. The exclusion 
fences constructed in the RAPADCS are therefore perimeter fences around clusters of 
properties working together.  
In accordance with the QFPI guidelines, the funding that RAPAD received had to be disbursed to 
one entity, and not to each participating landholder in a cluster. Therefore, the cluster had to reach 
an agreement about the legal vehicle or business structure most suited to this funding 
arrangement. Once the particular legal entity received the grant funding, the monies could be 
disbursed to each landholder to reimburse them for the cost of their fence construction to the 
extent of $2,700 per kilometre of fence. A document analysis of all 23 the clusters in Round 1 and 
Round 2 confirmed that all of the clusters used an incorporated association, registered under the 
Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld).  
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10 Understanding the nature of the fence 
This Research Paper analyses different conceptions of partnerships, collaboration and cooperation 
in reference to two exclusion fencing schemes. However, the fences themselves, are unrelated to 
mutual ownership, or cooperative ownership, or any form of legal partnership, except to the extent 
that it is a ‘dividing fence’. 
It is submitted that in order to find the most appropriate legal framework and business model for 
infrastructure investment projects that involve multiple stakeholders, it is important to understand: 
 The nature of the asset 
 What the asset does, and 
 Who benefits from the asset, both directly and indirectly. 
Whether in reference to exclusion fencing or other infrastructure investment projects, an analysis of 
these factors provides a clear delineation between decision rights, ownership rights, ownership 
obligations and control rights in multi-stakeholder infrastructure investment projects, that: 
 Are an indicator of the complexity of the arrangement between the parties 
 Drives the choice of legal structure most suited to the investment 
 Identifies the risks associated with the project from different perspectives 
 Matches investment to return. 
The analysis is particularly useful in infrastructure investment projects that involve private sector 
participation.  
Private sector participants will seek reward. Their reward may entail ownership rights that may be 
realised at a later stage with a capital return. If their participation does not involve ownership rights 
over an asset, they will seek a different reward. Unless they are guaranteed a return for 
participating but holding no ownership rights, they would be unwilling to participate, except when 
their initial short term return is significant, or another party (typically the government) guarantees 
their entitlement to reward. By analysing the nature of the asset, what it does, and who benefits 
from it, these types of long term project risks will be identified and dealt with. All three factors will 
be discussed in turn in reference to the LES and RAPADCS. 
 
10.1 The nature of the asset 
In the case of the LES, the successful applicants are single graziers. The LES fences are 
constructed to enclose the outer perimeter of one particular property or part thereof. The exclusion 
fence is thus that participant’s fence, constructed on their property. Alternatively, they share 
ownership of the fence with an adjoining owner if it is built on the boundary. But, in principle, the 
participant in the LES has ownership of the fence after completion. The fence enhances the value 
of their property, is affixed to the land through posts and, if adequately maintained, has a long 
effective life. 
In the case of cluster fences constructed in the RAPADCS, each participating grazier takes 
responsibility to construct a part of the fence on their property. Their part of the cluster fence would 
link up with the same new fence on the property of a neighbour who is also a participant in the 
cluster. Except for a fence post where the two parts of their cluster fence connect, the two cluster 
participants do not share the fence. They each construct a part of a fence linked up to form the 
cluster area.  
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Therefore, in both the LES and RAPADCS, the exclusion fences are shared with adjoining 
neighbours who are not participants in the schemes. Therefore, the notion of a partnership, 
collaboration and cooperation does not extend to legal ownership of the exclusion fences 
in reference to the scheme participants.  
As a result, it is not necessary to use a new or separate legal business structure to hold the 
exclusion fence. And as each of the participants in the respective schemes fund their own cost of 
their own fence, it is also not necessary to use a vehicle to pool their resources to construct the 
fence. Doing so would add an unnecessary layer of complexity. 
It is only in reference to landholders on neighbouring properties who are not participants in the 
schemes that questions relevant to shared fences arise. To that extent, graziers who are not 
participants in the scheme may, in fact, be free riders who benefit from the construction of modern 
exclusion fences on their properties, without bearing any economic cost.  
 
10.2 What the asset does 
An exclusion fence does not generate any specific income. It has no direct production value, and 
cannot be directly associated with a particular item of trading stock or livestock. The fence is only 
associated with future lambing and lambing survival rate increases. The size of the property, 
quality of pastures, availability of water and existing numbers of livestock on each property are 
equally relevant factors. On the other hand, an exclusion fence is associated with savings gained 
from a reduction in stock losses and a reduction in money spent on pest management that may be 
easier to quantify.  
As an exclusion fence does not generate a direct income stream, there is no merit in using a legal 
business structure such as a private company or partnership for the infrastructure investment 
project, as there is no income to distribute. It is only in reference to some of the ongoing costs to 
maintain the fence that costs may be shared. A complex legal arrangement or structure is not 
suited to the sharing of costs. 
 
10.3 Who benefits from the asset, both directly and indirectly 
The landholder who constructs the exclusion fence benefits from it. So too do landholders on 
adjoining properties or internally enclosed properties if there were to be any. 
Freeriding associated with dividing fences is a common problem. But the important point is that 
freeriding related to the construction of an exclusion fence is entirely quantifiable and a regulatory 
process exists to deal with the matter of the costs associated with the fence, albeit that there is no 
guarantee that the costs will be shared. 
In Queensland – as is the case in the other states and territories – there is broad recognition that 
fences and the cost of fences are prone to dispute and freeriding. The risk and cost of freeriding 
are thus known and quantifiable if the cost of the construction of a fence is known. The identity of 
fence free riders is also known, as they are the owners of the neighbouring property.  
This position is different from freeriding that may be associated with telecommunication 
infrastructure such as satellite base stations that are connected to open telecommunication 
networks such as that described in Table 7. In that case, the number of passers-by who connect to 
the network asset is unknown. Their identities are unknown. As a result, there is little that may be 
done to get these free riders to pay their fair share, unless another party or service provider is 
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involved in the venture to identify all users, and users are otherwise bound to pay based on 
general use terms. 
Freeriding associated with the construction cost of exclusion fences is neatly defined and dealt with 
from a regulatory perspective. In brief, the Neighbourhood Disputes (Dividing Fences and Trees) 
Act 2011 (Qld) sets out the process that landowners should follow when they want to construct a 
dividing fence. In general, neighbours must contribute equally to the building and maintenance of a 
dividing fence.80  
A dividing fence means a ‘common boundary of adjoining lands’.81 The cost of the fencing work to 
be shared between adjoining owners includes the design, construction, replacement, repair and 
maintenance.82 Adjoining owners are defined as ‘the owners of land on either side of a common 
boundary’.83 In the case of agricultural or pastoral land, adjoining ownership could also arise from 
an agreement between the landowners, or through a determination by Queensland Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal if it decides that the fence has been used as a dividing fence between two 
parcels of land.84  
If one of the property owners wish to construct a dividing fence at a standard greater than the 
standard for a sufficient dividing fence, that owner is generally solely responsible to pay to the 
extent that the cost exceeds a standard fence.85 Therefore, as the cost of an exclusion fence 
exceeds the cost of a standard dividing fence, it may be that the participants in the LES or 
RAPADCS will be liable for the difference, keeping in mind that the adjoining landholder who 
shares the fence is not a participant in the scheme.  
If an adjoining owner wants another adjoining owner to contribute to a dividing fence, they should 
give the other written notice,86 accompanied by at least one written quote stating an estimate of the 
total cost.87 Until there is an agreement between the parties, neither may carry out the fence 
work.88 In the case of the RAPADCS, a document analysis of cluster documents for all 23 the 
clusters involved in Round 1 and Round 2 revealed that cluster participants gave notice to their 
neighbours and generally, adjoining owners made a contribution equal to at least their half of the 
cost of a standard fence.  
Even if adjoining owners cannot agree, the landowner who wants to construct the fence is still free 
to do so, but only on their own property, not on the boundary. This decision has obvious cost 
implications, as they would have to pay for the full construction of the fence. But it may be that the 
particular common boundary is small enough, so that the total construction cost of that particular 
part of the fence situated on their side of the boundary, is smaller than the economic benefits 
arising from the fence over time, even if they have to pay for the fence themselves. 
In the case of the RAPADCS, a different form of free riding is intrinsically and fundamentally part of 
each cluster fence. To the extent that the size of properties in a cluster differs, landholders 
contribute differentially for the construction of the fence, but proportional to the length of the fence 
on their property. Smaller landholders, or landholders who are responsible for shorter parts of the 
fence, therefore benefit indirectly from the larger parts of the fence they do not pay for.  
  
                                                     
80 Neighbourhood Disputes (Dividing Fences and Trees) Act 2011 (Qld) ss 7(2)(a), 21(1). 
81 Neighbourhood Disputes (Dividing Fences and Trees) Act 2011 (Qld) s 12(1). 
82 Neighbourhood Disputes (Dividing Fences and Trees) Act 2011 (Qld) s 16. 
83 Neighbourhood Disputes (Dividing Fences and Trees) Act 2011 (Qld) s 15(1). 
84 Neighbourhood Disputes (Dividing Fences and Trees) Act 2011 (Qld) s 15(2). 
85 Neighbourhood Disputes (Dividing Fences and Trees) Act 2011 (Qld) s 21(2). 
86 Neighbourhood Disputes (Dividing Fences and Trees) Act 2011 (Qld) s 30, div 2. 
87 Neighbourhood Disputes (Dividing Fences and Trees) Act 2011 (Qld) s 31(3). 
88 Neighbourhood Disputes (Dividing Fences and Trees) Act 2011 (Qld) s 31(7). 
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11 Sharing the maintenance burden 
Generally speaking, all fences require maintenance. To the extent that a fence constitutes a 
dividing fence, maintenance costs ought to be shared,89 failing which the dispute resolution 
process set out in the Neighbourhood Disputes (Dividing Fences and Trees) Act 2011 (Qld) 
applies. As with the capital construction cost of an exclusion fence, it may be in the best interests 
of the party wishing to effect the repairs and maintenance to simply get on with it. It is likely that the 
integrity of the fence provides a degree of protection against wild dog predation that is quantifiable 
in terms of the expense to repair and maintain the fence, as well as in reference to livestock and 
lambing numbers. 
In relation to the ongoing maintenance of the cluster fence, there is a risk of free riding among the 
participants in a cluster. Participants in a cluster fencing scheme have to rely on each other to: 
1. Monitor the integrity of the fence 
2. Maintain the fence.  
Weaknesses in the fence on one property is a risk to the whole cluster. However, each part of the 
fence is situated on the land that belongs to a particular participant, and the remaining participants 
have no legal standing generally, to enter the property of a neighbour to monitor, maintain or repair 
the fence if that person fails to do so in the first instance.  
To address this risk, some of the RAPADCS deeds of agreement entered into by cluster 
participants provide a mechanism that allows each of them reasonable access to the property of 
other participants if the latter fail to adequately maintain and repair the fence. Some agreements 
also provide for a particular process related to the monitoring of the fence as a whole, and others 
require the defaulting party to reimburse the others for the cost of the repairs and maintenance that 
they failed to do. In some of the clusters, the right to access a particular strip of land adjacent to 
and on the inside of the cluster to take corrective action if another cluster participant fails to do so, 
is present. This right is similar to the right of access that different tiers of government have to enter 
the property to maintain the 2,500 kilometre long government controlled barrier fence across 
several states. The Biosecurity Act 2014 (Qld),90 and the Land Protection (Pest and Stock Route 
Management ) Act 2002 (Qld),91 work together to ensure that the relevant authority is able to 
maintain the fence and clear 20 m either side, after obtaining written permission to do so from 
landholders, or giving written notice to enter their land. 
Overall, there are inconsistencies and different approaches to the monitoring of the RAPAD cluster 
fences. These are summarised in Table 8.  
The extent to which the monitoring of cluster fences are not regularised or dealt with in the deed 
agreements may not matter from a practical perspective, as long as the trust relationship between 
the parties is maintained and each of them takes reasonable steps to monitor the fence.  
 
  
                                                     
89 Neighbourhood Disputes (Dividing Fences and Trees) Act 2011 (Qld) s 16. 
90 Biosecurity Act 2014 (Qld) s 91. 
91 Land Protection (Pest and Stock Route Management) Act 2002 (Qld) ss 51, 52. 
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 Number of clusters 
with the particular 
arrangement: 
Total number of clusters 23 
General obligation for members to monitor the fence 23 
Members must check the fence 8 
Specific procedures or timelines for members to check the fence:  
The group as a whole, once a year 1 
One specific member must check the fence once fortnightly for the first 6 
months, and then once a month for 12 months 
2 
Monthly and as soon as possible after every rain event, noting it is unclear 
whether this obligation rests upon one member, all individual members, or the 
group 
2 
At least monthly, noting it is unclear whether this obligation rests upon one 
member, all individual members, or the group 
1 
Once every 5 weeks, noting it is unclear whether this obligation rests upon one 
member, all individual members, or the group 
1 
The group as a whole, 2 or 3 times per year for the first year, and thereafter 
once a significant weather event occurs 
1 
The management committee of the incorporated association checks the fence:  
As a general obligation 1 
As agreed upon between them 1 
Once a year 1 
Twice each year 3 
Table 8 – Fence monitoring arrangements in clusters in the RAPADCS 
 
Turning next to cluster fence repair arrangements: A document analysis of RAPADCS deed 
agreements revealed similar inconsistencies and various approaches summarised in Table 9. 
From a practical perspective, regardless of the nature and extent of the contractual arrangement 
concerning repairs and maintenance, the time it takes to follow the notification process set out in 
the relevant agreements may be too long to address the immediate risk that wild dogs may enter 
the cluster area.  
As most graziers have the skill and experience to construct and maintain fences, it may be that it is 
in their own interest and the interest of the cluster to simply get on with it and to repair the fence. 
Doing so is unlikely to be costly when compared to the construction cost of the cluster fence and to 
the cost of doing nothing to re-establish the integrity of the fence.  
Thereafter, taking legal action to recoup money spent is always an option under the common law, 
and relevant to some of the deeds of agreement in the RAPADCS. But the cost of doing so is likely 
prohibitive and places the social construct of the cluster at risk. 
Therefore, even in cluster fencing schemes that involve specific contractual arrangements between 
cluster participants, there is a monitoring and maintenance freeriding risk that has no regulatory 
solution. 
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 Number of clusters 
with the particular 
arrangement: 
Total number of clusters 23 
Agreements that provide for rectification of damage to the fence 21 
When can a rectification notice be issued:  
Member fails to comply with maintenance obligations  20 
When the management committee’s annual inspection determines the fence is not 
in a proper condition 
1 
Who gives the rectification notice:  
Association 2 
Association and remaining members/landowners 15 
Management committee 1 
How is the rectification notice given:  
Written 3 
Not specifically specified, noting the general provision of notification in writing 18 
How quickly should the fence be repaired or rectified:  
24 hours 14 
3 days 1 
30 days 1 
Rectification process made in consultation with defaulting member/landowner 1 
Who bears the costs of the repairs and related legal fees:  
To be at the cost of the defaulting member 17 
Not specified 1 
Access to land to repair a fence on another member’s property:  
Agreements that provide for access to land for the purpose of rectification works 20 
Agreements that do not provide for access to land for the purpose of rectification 
works 
3 
Immediate access to defaulting members land for rectification works without notice:  
2m within the relevant section of Cluster Fence 8 
4m within the relevant section of Cluster Fence 1 
10m within the relevant section of Cluster Fence  6 
Access must be in consult with landowner 1 
Association/other landholders have immediate access without notice in emergency 
and 24 hours’ notice otherwise, to carry out maintenance 
3 
Access for the sole purpose of inspection/repairs with 24 hours’ notice to a landholder 1 
Table 9 – Repair arrangements in the RAPADCS 
 
12 Case study 1: The relationship between the funding 
arrangement and the business model in the LES 
The funding arrangement and business model of the LES and RAPADCS differ in a number of 
respects. The policy tool employed to fund exclusion fences in the LES is a long term loan. The 
funding model in the RAPADCS entails co-contributions from the state and participants, wherein 
the state’s participation is to provide grant funding as the policy tool to achieve the objectives of a 
multi-property cluster fence. The time scales of the schemes are also different, as is the party who 
bears the credit risk. 
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12.1 Timing and the fixed term nature of the LES 
The funding arrangement for the construction of the LES exclusion fences entails loan funding from 
the State to a local government authority, the LRC. The term of the loan is 20 years and the 
interest rate is fixed. 
Landholders who participate in the scheme do not incur debt financing when they 
participate. Their obligation is a fixed special rates obligation, payable over 20 years, 
summarised in Table 10.92 Put differently, Table 10 sets out the relative size of the investment of 
each landholder in their exclusion fence. 
 
PROPERTY REFERENCE Interest only per 
 year:  
Year 3, 4, 5 
Principle and  
interest per year:  
Year 6 to 20 
Total special  
rate:  
Year 1 to 20 
A1667 $4,949 $10,825 $177,215 
A2009 $658 $1,438 $23,549 
A20166, A20159, A20175, A20164 $9,251 $20,234 $331,264 
A20162 $5,494 $12,017 $196,733 
A1886 $2,604 $5,696 $93,246 
A20120 $811 $1,773 $29,029 
A20174 $1,958 $4,283 $70,114 
A1875 $3,868 $8,460 $138,498 
A30177 $6,489 $14,193 $232,361 
A1634 $2,725 $5,959 $97,564 
A30443 $3,907 $8,545 $139,894 
A1635, A1631, A1633 $4,055 $8,868 $145,190 
A2149, A1899 $2,752 $6,019 $98,535 
A2178 $1,820 $3,980 $65,160 
A20161 $2,485 $5,436 $89,004 
A20157 $10,548 $23,072 $377,724 
A1686 $956 $2,092 $34,245 
A30226 $2,667 $5,834 $95,517 
A30220 $3,019 $6,604 $108,120 
A20150 $2,155 $4,717 $77,223 
A30209 $3,250 $7,108 $116,367 
A1849 $4,425 $9,679 $158,465 
A30351 $842 $1,841 $30,146 
A20138 $4,396 $9,616 $157,436 
A20158 $3,231 $7,066 $115,689 
A1676 $8,818 $19,287 $315,751 
A30236 $454 $994 $16,272 
A30196 $2,170 $4,747 $77,720 
A20176 $5,776 $12,633 $206,828 
A1692 $3,587 $7,845 $128,437 
A1891 $12,882 $28,177 $461,296 
                                                     
92 Longreach Regional Council, Budget 2019-2020 (Confirmed Minutes, Budget Meeting, 29 July 2019) 26–7. 
 Place-value economic development in remote Queensland 40 
 
A1700, A30427 $2,948 $6,448 $105,564 
A20118 $3,132 $6,850 $112,139 
A30243 $2,480 $5,425 $88,815 
A1715 $363 $795 $13,008 
A20132 $3,594 $7,861 $128,692 
A1695 $7,430 $16,252 $266,067 
A1694 $6,225 $13,615 $222,905 
A30353 $7,453 $16,303 $266,902 
A1935 $10,883 $23,696 $388,085 
A1726 $4,570 $9,996 $163,644 
A20139 $12,738 $27,862 $456,145 
A1881 $4,615 $10,095 $165,267 
A30297 $9,288 $20,317 $332,613 
A1609 $8,610 $18,833 $308,332 
A1886 $2,432 $5,320 $87,102 
A1912 $3,787 $8,283 $135,602 
A20219 $3,173 $6,941 $113,632 
A20141 $7,253 $15,865 $259,738 
A30223 $5,109 $11,174 $182,939 
A20151, A1666 $9,984 $21,838 $357,527 
A1888 $2,402 $5,254 $86,023 
A1928 $1,263 $2,762 $45,225 
A20133 $536 $1,173 $19,204 
A20117 $346 $756 $12,383 
A1930 $3,128 $6,842 $112,020 
 TOTAL     $8,834,164 
Table 10 – Special rates payable for investment in cluster fences in the LES by property 
 
The budgeted construction cost of the exclusion fences in the LES is $8,000 per kilometre, of 
which $4,500 relates to the cost of material that is sourced by the LRC.93 It is not possible to 
determine how the actual cost of each fence compares to the budget, as no data are publicly 
available about the length and final cost of each fence.  
What is known, is that the total dollar value of the special rates payable by each participant is a 
factor of the costs associated with the borrowings of the LRC, the purchase cost of the material 
and the sum needed to construct each fence. This sum varies depending on the type of pastures, 
presence of trees, weeds and water crossings, as well as sloping of the land. At the completion of 
each fence, the overall cost of the construction is known and the special rates obligation of each 
participant is calculated and fixed. In year 1 and 2, there are no special rate payments for any of 
the participants. In years 3, 4 and 5, only interest is payable (constituting 8.4 per cent of the total 
special rates value). This five year period coincides with the estimated time that it takes to show 
returns from an exclusion fence through an increase in sheep numbers as explained above. The 
remainder of principal and interest are then paid over 15 years.94 The special rates commenced in 
the 2019–20 LRC financial year.95 
                                                     
93 Premier’s Office (Qld), ‘Longreach Exclusion Fencing to Review Sheep and Wool Industry’ (Media Release, 1 December 2016); 
Longreach Regional Council, Budget 2018-2019 (Unconfirmed Minutes, Budget Meeting, 5 July 2018) 110–11. 
94 Longreach Regional Council, Budget 2019-2020 (Confirmed Minutes, Budget Meeting, 29 July 2019) 94. 
95 Longreach Regional Council, 2018-2019 Annual Report (Report, 2019) 43. 
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To summarise, the loan repayment terms that the LRC must adhere to, and the special rates 
obligations of participating landholders are the same: 
 Both entail a fixed obligation 
 The underlying low interest rate in both are fixed and 
 The payback periods are the same, being 20 years. 
In reference to the comparison between the effective useful life of the fence and the period over 
which the landholder pays the special rates, there is more uncertainty. It may be that the exclusion 
fence is still in good order after 20 years, but that depends on a range of factors such as fence 
maintenance, floods and the number of water crossings. 
Turning next to the respective sources of funding used to repay the loan and the special rates: The 
LRC has a fixed repayment obligation and uses fixed special rates income to service this 
obligation. Therefore, the financing and funding model of the LRC involve no additional funding 
requirements or timing differences that the council must fund as the net position of the LRC is 
relatively neutral at any point in time as long as participants pay their special rates. 
Landowners are in a different position. The simple truth is that primary production income and cash 
flow varies generally, and more so under drought conditions and where graziers have de-stocked. 
The existence of an exclusion fence does not imply that income will flow from it, nor that the 
income that does flow as a result of the fence will be sufficient to pay the special rate. Therefore, 
the LRC bears the credit risk associated with the loan. It is the LRC that stands under an 
obligation to repay the QTC loan, irrespective of whether landholders pay their special rates. That 
said, the special rates are levied over a 20-year period, resulting in relatively low annual obligations 
as set out in Table 10, thus reducing the dollar value of any credit risk.  
 
12.2 Credit risk 
At first glance, it may appear that this risk is significant when it is considered that the LES is aimed 
at landholders who are reluctant to take on more debt financing due to the prevailing drought and 
the impact of the wild dog predation problem. Therefore, it is likely that financial institutions already 
hold mortgages over the properties where the exclusion fences are constructed. It is also likely that 
the financial position of these participants would preclude them from obtaining debt financing to 
construct the fence on their own. 
The question then arises (particularly if a financial institution holds a mortgage over the property) 
what recourse there is for the LRC to recover any special rates owing to it if the landholder 
defaults. A failure to recover the rates is inequitable to other participants and to other ratepayers in 
the first instance. Secondly, it should be considered that the exclusion fence is essentially an 
immoveable asset that has little value when it is removed from a property, other than scrap value. 
Removing the fence to recover unpaid special rates by selling it at scrap value also puts a new 
burden on the government to apply pest management measures to a previously protected piece of 
land. 
But, in the case of the LES, the LRC is a preferred creditor, and first in line to recover any special 
rates owing to it, even before mortgage holders due to the operation of the Local Government Act 
2009 (Qld) and the Local Government Regulation 2012 (Qld). Division 3 of the Local Government 
Regulation 2012 (Qld) is concerned with the power of a local government to sell or acquire land for 
overdue rates or charges. Generally, once rates are overdue for three years, the local government 
may, by resolution, decide to sell the land, giving notice of intent to do so.96 Properties are then 
                                                     
96 Local Government Regulation 2012 (Qld) s 140. 
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generally sold by auction. A reserve price is set, and if the reserve price is not achieved, the 
property will be sold to the highest bidder. If the highest bidder does not agree to purchase the 
land, then the land is taken to have been sold to the local government.97 
The proceeds of the sale must be used in the following order:98 
1. To pay the expenses of the sale 
2. To pay any land taxes owing on the day of the sale 
3. To pay overdue rates or charges for the land 
4. To pay any registered encumbrances, other than State encumbrances, in order of their priority 
under the Land Title Act 
5. To pay any body corporate fees that the owner of the land owed immediately before the sale 
6. To pay the person who owned the land immediately before the sale.  
Therefore, the LRC has a low credit risk due to the first right it has over the property in the event of 
default, and due to the relatively low dollar values of annual special rates.  
The net result of the LES, as long as participants pay their special rates are that: 
 The LES involves no net outflow for the State – it merely advances a loan and the loan is 
repaid 
 The State earns a fixed return on investment in the form of interest  
 There are no private benefits that arise in the hands of the participating graziers that is a cost 
to the government, as they pay for the fence in full  
 The LRC has no net outflow of funds, except for the administration of the scheme 
 Participating graziers are likely to reap economic benefits flowing from increases in sheep 
numbers and wool production 
 The community benefits from the resultant economic growth potential and 
 The scheme achieves pest management goals across the council area. 
 
13 Case study 2: The relationship between the funding 
arrangement and the business model in the 
RAPADCS 
The funding arrangement in the RAPADCS involves co-funding of a cluster fence. Based on cluster 
project budgets, the government contributes around 35 per cent of the cost of the fence through 
grant funding which is capped at $2,700 per kilometre, and the remainder of the cost is borne by 
cluster participants. Using $2,700 as an estimate of 35 per cent of the cost of a fence per 
kilometre, the budgeted total cost per kilometre for the QFPI scheme is $7,714, which compares 
favourably to the $8,000 per kilometre in the LES. 
  
                                                     
97 Local Government Regulation 2012 (Qld) s 143. 
98 Local Government Regulation 2012 (Qld) s 146. 
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13.1 The flow of cash 
In the RAPADCS, each cluster participant is responsible for their own construction costs in 
reference to their own part of the fence. To the extent that they have to pay for costs in cash, they 
have to make their own funding arrangements independent of the cluster scheme. Whether they 
self-fund the costs or use debt financing to do so involves the same decision process as with any 
other financing decision. Each participant’s own funding arrangement requires no new business 
model and no new legal structure as each participant already operates a primary production 
business. Constructing the fence is a part of the ordinary business conducted by a primary 
producer. The time period over which each cluster participant will repay their debt financing, if they 
used any to construct the fence, varies depending on their own arrangements. 
The flow of grant funding from the QFPI to each participating landholder occurs as follows: 
1. QFPI grant funding flows to RAPAD in the form of a one-off cash payment that is equal to their 
total funding allocation 
2. RAPAD makes the grant funding available to each cluster in four cash tranches equal to 50 
percent (tranche 1), 20 percent (tranche 2 and 3) and 10 per cent of the capped grant funding 
contribution of $2,700 per kilometre of cluster fencing constructed  
3. The RAPAD distributions are made directly to a new legal entity set up for the cluster 
arrangement under the RAPADCS. As explained above, all of the clusters in Round 1 and 
Round 2 of the RAPADCS adopted incorporated associations for this purpose 
4. The legal entity established specifically for purposes of the RAPADCS then reimburses 
participants their costs of material, grading etc., based on their actual costs incurred as 
evidenced by invoices, and capped at their relevant share of the grant funding received, based 
on the length of the section of the cluster fence they have to construct 
5. As part of the governance and oversight role that RAPAD has, each cluster entity must submit 
copies of the relevant invoices for the costs incurred by the cluster participants and the 
reimbursements to RAPAD, as well as the number of hours that the landholder and their 
employees and subcontractors spent to construct the fence, which is classified as in-kind 
contributions to the construction of the fence. In turn, RAPAD uses these for governance and 
reporting purposes. 
 
13.2 The establishment of a new separate legal entity 
Part 10 of this Research Paper explained that, due to the nature of an exclusion fence, no 
sophisticated business model, business structure or separate legal entity is necessary to establish 
the fence or to operate one. Exclusion fences do not generate direct income. The ownership of an 
exclusion fence is not shared beyond the regulatory perspective of the ‘dividing fence’. From the 
perspective of the allocation of ownership rights or entitlements, the requirement to establish a new 
legal entity to facilitate the flow of cash from the QFPI to landholders does not have any benefits. 
But a new legal entity that binds landholders formally has other benefits for the Queensland 
government, RAPAD and landholders. From the perspective of the State, interposing a new legal 
entity between the QFPI and landholders addresses the criticism that the grant funding provides 
direct private benefits to individual landholders in the form of a cost saving for the construction of 
the fence. From RAPAD’s perspective, dealing with one legal entity is administratively more 
efficient than it is to make separate reimbursements to individual landholders in a cluster. 
Conceptually the State government also achieves a higher degree of grant funding accountability 
and governance, and more effective pest management by requiring landholders to formalise their 
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arrangement through a new legal entity. The collective self-governance over the integrity and 
maintenance of the fence protects large areas of land more effectively against wild dog predation. 
In addition, as all of the legal entities applied in business structures in Australia require or imply 
member meetings, the personal landholder interaction that flows from that creates an environment 
in which they may share best practice pest management ideas. 
In and of itself, the choice of an incorporated association in all of the clusters in Round 1 and 
Round 2 presents evidence that it is not necessary to establish a sophisticated legal structure to 
facilitate payments to landholders or for reporting and governance purposes. For the most part, 
participants only share: 
 In the economic benefits of the cluster generally, which is difficult to predict, takes time to 
develop and is only relevant to each grazier business individually 
 A reliance on each other to monitor, maintain and repair the fence and 
 Experiences in managing the risk of wild dog predation. 
Cluster participants share no assets or revenue; only the cost associated with the legal entity itself. 
For the most part, these are limited to public liability insurance.99 The document analysis of the 
RAPADCS contractual arrangements revealed that none of the 23 clusters has a common pool to 
which participants contribute in so far as repairs to the fence go. Some of the cluster deeds of 
agreement include provisions for the pooling of cash on a fixed basis or in reference to the length 
of each landholders fence to pay for public liability insurance.  
In summary, the incorporated associations act as a conduit for the grant funding, have the potential 
to bind landholders for governance purposes and enables the sharing of best practice. Beyond 
these matters, the other control rights and obligations associated with the cluster fence could have 
easily been dealt with in a contract between the participants without the need to incorporate an 
association. In fact, the comparison of the rules or constitution of each incorporated association 
and the deed of agreement between participants, revealed that cluster-specific control and 
management rights, and member obligations were set out in the deed of agreement between them. 
The rules or constitutions of each of the incorporated associations were generic in nature. 
 
13.3 The features of an incorporated association 
Nevertheless, the choice to use an incorporated association is still appropriate due to the limited 
ownership and entitlement rights that exist between the members. In Queensland, incorporated 
associations are registered under the Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld). Incorporated 
associations have a not-for-profit purpose,100 and any remaining assets must be transferred to a 
similar entity at winding up.101  
The overall cost to register an incorporated association is low compared to other legal entities.102 
There are few constraints or limitations upon incorporated associations, bar the requirement that it 
must have seven members,103 a management committee,104 president and treasurer.105 In 
reference to the way that the RAPADCS operate, there are few reporting and audit-related 
requirements that must be met, as all of the RAPADCS incorporated associations are classified as 
                                                     
99 Associations Incorporations Act 1981 (Qld), s 70. 
100 Associations Incorporations Act 1981 (Qld), s 4. 
101 Associations Incorporations Act 1981 (Qld), s 92. 
102 A fee of $162.15 is payable as at December 2019. 
103 Associations Incorporations Act 1981 (Qld), s 5. 
104 Associations Incorporations Act 1981 (Qld), pt 7. 
105 Associations Incorporations Act 1981 (Qld), s 8. 
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level 3 incorporated associations.106 That means that there is an obligation upon the president and 
treasurer to sign a statement that the association keeps financial records ‘in a way that properly 
records the association’s income and expenditure and dealings with its assets and liabilities’,107 
and little more to comply with. For the most part, management rights and responsibilities in all of 
the RAPAD scheme clusters are focused on monitoring and maintaining the fence as summarised 
in Table 8 and 9.  
 
13.4 The funding model 
The key feature of the funding arrangement in the RAPADCS is the innovative way that the in-kind 
contributions of landholders are recognised in the project. Whereas the LRC facilitates the 
construction of exclusion fences in the LES, in part by procuring materials, landholders in the 
RAPADCS build the fences themselves to a large extent. As set out before, fencing is a normal 
part of most primary production businesses and an ongoing activity for graziers. The hours that 
landholders and their employees spend to construct a fence is a tangible and valuable contribution 
to the construction of a cluster fence.  
The budgeted hours that landholders and their employees expected to spend to construct each 
part of the cluster fence was an important component in the assessment of each application. The 
rate applied to these hours were standardised across all applications and were based on 
independent calculations by an economist commissioned by RAPAD. At the conclusion of the 
fence construction, each landholder provided their and their employees’ actual hours to RAPAD for 
reporting purposes, as well as an estimate of other related hours.108  
On that basis, the in-kind contributions to the construction of each cluster fence comprise of: 
 Clearing, costed at $150 per hour, classified as operational costs 
 Grading, costed at $80 per hour, classified as operational costs 
 Landholder labour hours, costed at $50 per hour, classified as labour costs 
 Employee labour hours, costed at $35 per hour, classified as labour costs 
 External labour hours, costed at $50 per hour, classified as labour costs 
 Equipment charges, costed at $100 per hour, classified as operational costs. 
The cash component of the construction of each cluster fence references the cost of the material. 
Grant funding towards material costs was capped at $2,700 per kilometre, and landholders had to 
fund the remainder. Overall, the dollar value of the in-kind contributions to the construction of the 
cluster fences is significant. Graph 1 presents the labour, material and operational cost 
components of each of the 23 cluster fences in Round 1 and Round 2 of the RAPADCS. Graph 2 
presents a comparison of the relative cash contributions from landholders and grant funding 
towards the cost of the material. 
  
                                                     
106 Associations Incorporations Act 1981 (Qld), s 59B. 
107 Associations Incorporations Act 1981 (Qld), s 59B(2)(b)(ii). 
108 Email from Morgan Gronold to Thea Voogt, 9 December 2019. 
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Graph 1 – Cost composition of cluster fences by cluster in percentage terms 
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Graph 2 – Landholder and grant funding contribution towards material 
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Therefore, the main difference between the LES and the RAPADCS is the overall cash outflow of 
each participating landholder: 
 Using the budgeted cost of $8,000 per kilometre as a benchmark in the LES, landholders are 
liable to pay for the full cost through the special rates 
 RAPADCS data reveal that landholders contributed significantly less cash to the construction 
of the cluster fences. Cash contributions for material across all 23 cluster totalled $14,669,618 
and the total length of cluster fences constructed totalled 2563 kilometres. On that basis, on 
average, landholder cash outflow per kilometre is estimated at $5,723. 
 
13.5 Clustering as an economic development tool in the RAPADCS 
Porter is widely regarded as the pioneer of cluster theory.109 Porter defines a cluster as a 
‘geographic concentration of interconnected companies and institutions in a particular field’.110 This 
definition fits the cluster arrangements in the RAPADCS. 
Clustering relies on synergies between participants, creates the platform for them to share 
knowledge, information or resources for economic benefit, and often achieves economies of scale 
through cost reduction or collective bargaining. Clustering focuses on linkages and 
interdependencies between participants, fosters collaboration between them, but allow a degree of 
independence so that the competition between them continues. Clustering stimulates growth and 
innovation, the effects of which spill over to firms outside of the cluster.111  
There are broadly three different types of clustering: horizontal, vertical and diagonal clustering.  
Horizontal clustering involves participation by firms in the same geographical location who have the 
same products or services and compete with each other. Their clustering advantages would 
depend on what they want to achieve. It may be that they want to share knowledge, use their 
collective bargaining power or buying power to increase sales, reduce costs or have access to 
more labour or infrastructure, which in turn, may hold cost savings advantages.112 Primarily 
clusters in the RAPADCS share knowledge and work together to apply for grant funding. 
Vertical clustering focuses on co-located firms in a particular industry supply chain with upstream 
or downstream advantages, depending on the position of a participant. Linkages in production, 
logistics and distribution, as well as co-sharing of infrastructure such as warehouses and trucks, is 
the driving force behind this form of clustering.113 Participation in the RAPADCS does not involve 
vertical clustering. 
Diagonal clustering involves the concentration of complimentary or symbiotic firms with distinct 
products or services that will add value to each other. For example in the tourism industry, package 
deals sold to consumers, facilitated through clusters, benefit a range of participants who have non-
competing products but add to the experience of consumers. The advantage to participants in this 
                                                     
109 House of Representatives Select Committee on Regional Development and Decentralisation, Parliament of Australia, Regions at the 
Ready: Investing in Australia’s Future (Report, June 2018) 61. 
110 Michael E Porter, ‘Clusters and the New Economics of Competition’ (November-December 1998) Harvard Business Review 77, 78 
111 Michael E Porter, ‘Clusters and the New Economics of Competition’ (November-December 1998) Harvard Business Review 77, 78; 
Michael Enright and Brian H Roberts, ‘Regional Clustering in Australia’ (2011) 26 Australian Journal of Management 65, 66–7; 
Sidsel Grimstad and John Burgess, ‘Environmental Sustainability and Competitive Advantage in a Wine Tourism Micro-cluster’ 
(2014) 37(6) Management Research Review 553, 553–4; Fang Huang and John Rice, ‘Does Open Innovation Work Better in 
Regional Clusters?’ (2013) 19(1) Australasian Journal of Regional Studies 85, 87, 90, 92. 
112 Michael E Porter, ‘Clusters and the New Economics of Competition’ (November-December 1998) Harvard Business Review 77, 78; 
EJ Michael, ‘Tourism Micro-clusters’ (2003) 9(2) Tourism Economics 133, 138. 
113 Sidsel Grimstad and John Burgess, ‘Environmental Sustainability and Competitive Advantage in a Wine Tourism Micro-cluster’ 
(2014) 37(6) Management Research Review 553, 559; EJ Michael, ‘Tourism Micro-clusters’ (2003) 9(2) Tourism Economics 133, 
138. 
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form of clustering is collective marketing without product competition.114 None of the characteristics 
of diagonal clustering is present in the RAPADCS. 
Much of Porter’s work was focused on horizontal clustering. At the centre of his conception of 
clusters was the necessary tension between competition and collaboration. The competition 
between firms in the cluster increases productivity, drives direction and the pace of innovation that 
underpins growth and stimulates new business, broadly through peer pressure and constant 
comparison through information sharing. To a lesser extent, the social interaction of cluster 
participants in the RAPADCS when they share their experiences with wild dog management 
relates to this aspect of clustering. 
Therefore, the ‘cluster’ concept used in Porter’s conception of economic development is watered 
down in cluster fencing arrangements, as these involve little in the form of asset and revenue 
sharing. 
 
14. Summary comparison of the main features of the two 
case studies 
By way of conclusion, the LES and RAPADCS have facilitated the construction of significant 
exclusion fences in the RAPAD region, facilitated through two policy tools: a long term loan and 
grant funding. The LES and RAPADCS both facilitate place-value economic development in a very 
remote area of Queensland. 
 The time that it takes to construct an exclusion fence is similar to the time it takes to construct 
a cluster fence 
 The term to repay the LES loan from the perspective of the LRC and participating graziers is 
20 years. That is different to the cash flow timing in the RAPADCS, as funds transfer to cluster 
participants conclude when the construction of the cluster fence is completed 
 Participants in the LES are liable for the full cost of the fence, but over a 20-year period. They 
benefit from the time value of money that reduces their overall cost 
 Participants in the RAPADCS benefit from a lower cash outlay as they participate in the 
construction of the fence. Their in-kind contributions are recognised in the overall project 
 The LES is not premised on cooperation between landholders. The requirement that 
participants RAPADCS must use one legal entity to access grant funding facilitates 
cooperation between them 
 The grant-funded RAPADCS results in the distribution of cash from the government to private 
landholders. There is no net cash outflow for the government in the LES 
 There is no credit risk associated with the RAPADCS, except to the extent that individual 
landholders have to use debt funding to pay for some of the fence construction, but the risk is 
borne by financial institutions, not parties to the cluster arrangement or the state 
 There is credit risk in the LES, borne by the LRC, but the risk is low 
 Partnerships, collaboration and cooperation are an essential part of both schemes, and involve 
the government and landholders 
                                                     
114 EJ Michael, ‘Tourism Micro-clusters’ (2003) 9(2) Tourism Economics 133, 138–9. 
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 As long as participant pay their special rates in the LES, no private benefits arise in the hands 
of landholders, except that they benefit from the time value of money, as they pay special 
rates over 20 years and an implied low interest rate  
 The grant funding in the RAPADCS reduces the cost of constructing the cluster fence in the 
RAPADCS. In that way, private benefits accrue directly to landholders as their capital outlay is 
lower. 
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